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This case is an appeal from a judgment and decree 
made and entered by the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Judge A. H. Ellett, December 24, 1948, setting 
aside a deed from the Granite Holding Company, one 
of the defendants, to William L. Hansen, another of the 
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defendants, and dated July 16, 1945, (T. 112). The 
judgment also awarded the Granite Holding Company 
judgment in the sum of $29,246.05 against William L. 
Hansen. In stating the facts we shall divide the state-
ment into three parts: I. The Pleadings and the Parties; 
II. 'The Testimony, (A) The Validity of the Deed, (B) 
The Accounting; III. The Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment of the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FOREWORD 
We attempted to summarize the evidence into a more 
concise statement than follows in this brief. We aban-
doned the effort, howev•er, because it was not possible 
to make a more brief summary and at the same time 
present clearly to this court the utter lack of support 
in the evidence for the findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and judgment herein. Our research has failed to 
disclose one single authority to support the trial court 
in this case, and a less complete summary of the evidence 
than we have given herein might lead this court to won-
der if we had not omitted to state some of the evidence. 
Therefore, we concluded to attempt to state the sub-
stance of the evidence of every witness. We have also 
set forth as briefly as possible the substance of the 
pleadings and the court's findings, conclusions and judg-
ment. We hope that this will give in the pages of this 
brief a complete picture of the record to each member 
of the court. 
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I. THE PLEADINGS AND THE PARTIES 
The identity of the parties and the dates of the 
pleadings have a rna terial place in this action. The ac-
tion is one in equity and was commenced by Lewis F. 
Hansen and Clyde Hansen as plaintiff's against the de-
fendants by a complaint filed December 21, 1946, and 
summons served December 23, 1946, (T. 1-9). The com-
plaint in substance alleges that the plaintiffs are stock-
holders of the defendant corporation and "bring this 
action for and in behalf of said corporation'' and for 
themselves and other stockholders who are interested 
and desire to join and share the costs; that the defend-
ant, Nephi Hansen, since and prior to 1928 has pre-
sumed to act as the president and general manager and 
director of the corporation, and that since said time no 
legal or regular meetings of stockholders or directors 
of said corporation have been held and ''no one has 
been legally authorized to manage or direct the affairs 
and business of said corporation, and the defendant, 
Nephi J. Hansen, has presumed to use the corporation 
and its property for his own interest and benefit''; that 
the corporation has failed to keep books and records ; 
that the stock of the corporation is divided into 3500 
shares of common and 3500 shares of preferred stock 
with cumulative dividends for the preferred stock; that 
in 1919 a new board of directors was established and 
that of this board all but three of the directors are dead, 
and that those three are the defendant, Nephi J. Han-
sen, and the plaintiffs, Clyde Hansen and Lewis F. IIan-
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sen, and that for a number of years last past there has 
been no legally constituted board of directors; that the 
corporation for many years has heen the owner and en-
titled to the possession of certain property, describing 
it, (this property is situated at the southwest corner 
of 11th East and 21st 'South in Salt Lake City) ; that the 
said property has been producing substantial rental 
income but plaintiffs cannot state the amount, and on 
information and belief state that it is in excess of 
$2500.00 per month; that plaintiffs have no knowledge 
as to the handling and disposition of the income but 
allege on information and belief that the corporation is 
insolvent or in danger of insolvency, and that the assets 
and property have been and are now being dissipated, 
and the corporation is unable to pay its obligations or 
protect the investment of the stockholders unless the 
court appoints a receiver. 
The complaint then alleges that on or about the 
16th day of July, 1945, a deed to the abov.e described 
property was made, executed, delivered and recorded 
in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, 
purporting to convey the property from the defendant 
corporation to the defendant, William L. Hansen, for a 
purported consideration of $10,000.00; that the deed 
was not authorized or executed by the corporation pur-
suant to resolution of the board of directors and with-
out authority of the board of directors or the stock-
holders or any authority of the company or its officers or 
stockholders to the president of the corporation or any 
other officer to sell or dispose of the property, and that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
the property is all of the assets of the corporation; that 
the consideration ·was grossl~· inadequate; that the pro-
perty was worth in excess of $200,000.00, and that the con-
sideration of $10,000.00 'Yas not fully paid h~· the defend-
ant, "~illimn L. Hansen, and the corporation never did 
receive the n1oney therefor. These allegations are upon 
information and belief. Continuing·, the cmnplaint alleges 
that the defendant, Nephi Hansen, is in practical con-
trol of the corporation and dominates its affairs, and 
that an appeal to the corporation to protect the stock-
holders would be futile and useless. The complaint then 
asks for the appointment of a receiver; that the court 
enter a decree adjudging the def-endant corporation to 
be the owner of the aforesaid property clear of any 
claims of defendant, William L. Hansen; that defend-
ants, ~ ephi Hansen and William Hans·en, be required 
to render an accounting in favor of the corporation, and 
for general relief. 
Clyde Hansen was joined as a plaintiff without his 
authority and approval and his name was stricken as a 
plaintiff April 21, 1947, (T. 22), when the demurrers to 
the complaint came on for hearing. 
An amended complaint was filed August 14, 1947, 
(T. 26-32), at which time more than two years after the 
deed was given, the court permitted to be added as plain-
tiffs W. V. Jensen, Mrs. J. E. Jensen, Ralph Cutler, 
Hettie May Bates and Rohert Young, (T. 23). The 
amended complaint alleged essentially the same matters 
as the original complaint and also. that Nephi J. Hansen 
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controlled the corporation, failed to call stockholders' 
meetings, prevented the holding of stockholders' and di-
rectors' meetings, and that year after year he repre-
sented to the stockholders that there were no items of 
business exce'pt the liquidation of the mortgage indebted-
ness, ''and that by his said representations said defend-
ant discouraged inquiry into the affairs of the corpo:·n-
tion and lulled the stockholders into inaction''; that 
Nephi Hansen since 1928 has presumed to make all the 
decisions and do all of the corporate acts; that he ltas 
not kept any records, and that since 1928 he has treated 
the corporation as his individual property, that in 1919 
the articles of incorporation required the establishment 
of a sinking fund, but that no such fund has ever been 
established for the retirement of preferred stock, and 
that no dividends have ever been paid since shortly 
after 1919 ; that during all of said years Nephi Hansen 
has failed to consult any other directors or hold direc-
tors' m·eetings or ''to permit vacancies to be filled on 
the board of directors'' ; that Nephi Hansen had re-
peatedly told the preferred stockholders that dividends 
could not be paid, and that he was liquidating the real 
properties of the corporation, and that he has failed 
and neglected during ·all the years to furnish the stock-
holders with any information; that two years prior to 
the commencement of this action Nephi Hansen informed 
the plaintiff, Lewis F. Hansen, that it would be wis·e to 
sell the property, and that he sold the property to de-
fendant, William L. Hansen, for $10,000.00 by deed in 
the name of the corporation, and that that was an at-
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ten1pted disposition of all of the ass·ets of the corpora-
tion, and that during the period Nephi Hansen advised 
the stockholders that a sale was being negotiated. The 
amended complaint asked for the same reli·ef as the 
original complaint. 
The complaint and amended complaint with Clyde 
Hansen eliminated, thus in substance allege: 1. That 
plaintiffs are stockholders of the defendant, Granite 
Holding Company, and that plaintiff, Lewis F. Hansen, 
since 1919 has been and at the time of the transaction 
complained of was a director; that no dividends have 
been paid for a period of more than twenty years; that 
during all that time Nephi Hansen has operated the 
corporation as his own property, given the stockholders 
no information, liquidated its properties without their 
consent and approval, and advised the stockholders that 
he was doing so, held no directors' meetings and con-
ducted the business of the Granite Holding Company as 
he personally saw fit. 2. That on or about July 16, 1945, 
he gave a deed in the name of the Granite Holding Com-
pany to defendant, William L. Hansen, his son, for a 
recited consideration of $10,000.00 for the property in 
question at 11th East and 21st South, the last remaining 
asset of the corporation. Based upon such allegations 
the plaintiff asked that the deed be set aside and the pro-
perty declared to be that of the Granite Holding Com-
pany, and that the defendants Hansen account to the 
Granite Holding Company. There is no offer or tender 
on the part of the plaintiffs to do equity or to return 
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any consideration received by the corporation to Wil-
liam L. Hansen. 
Defendants demurred to both complaints, particular-
ly on the ground that the complaints show upon their face 
that all the plaintiffs are estopped to secure the relief 
prayed for; that there is no offer or tender to do equity; 
that the plaintiffs have acquiesced in the acts of Nephi 
J. Hansen for upwards of twenty-five years, and that the 
complaints themselves do not show or allege that $10,-
000.00 was the actual consideration because the com-
plaints show that there was a mortgage upon the pro-
perty and do not recite the amount of the mortgage. 
The defendant, William L. Hansen, also at the beginning 
of the trial objected to the plaintiffs proceeding at all 
upon the grounds that the action actually is one by the 
corporation to rescind its deed, and the complaint shows 
upon its face that the corporation received $10,000.00 
in addition to an assumption of its mortgage by William 
L. Hansen, and is making no offer or tender to return 
what it received, ('T. 142, 143), and that the complaint 
affirmatively sets forth allegations which show an ·esto1J'" 
pel against the corporation and the stockholders so far 
as William L. Hansen is concerned. This defendant also 
asked for a non-suit at the close of plaintiffs' case, (T. 
359). 
At the beginning of the case the court asked counsel 
for the plaintiffs if they were in a position to make a 
tender. 
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":J[R. JEX~K~r: \Yell, l nm not in a po:::;ition to 
answer that question right now. 
'"THE COURT: If you are not in position to do 
it, there wouldn't be any need of taking a lot 
of other evidence and finally come around to 
the si tnation where you would have to make 
your tender in order to get this thing set 
aside. 
'' ~IR. JONES: In view of the statement that 
counsel just made to Your Honor, I renew 
the motion I made. 
''THE COURT: Well, I'll take care of that later. 
I have ruled on that motion heretofore at this 
stage, and you may proceed, Mr. Jensen.'' 
(T. 151, 152). 
During this same episode efforts were made to get 
Mr. Jensen to admit or deny that he was the attorney for 
the plaintiff, nfr. Cutler, which question he evaded by 
refusing to answer directly as to Mr. Cutler and replied: 
"I represent all the plaintiffs", (T. 151, 152). 
The answers and amended answers deny that the 
plaintiffs, W. V. Jensen and Mrs. J. E. Jensen, are stock-
holders, assert that the Granite Holding Company is im-
properly joined as a defendant; that full consideration 
was paid by William L. Hansen for the property; that 
the stockholders of defendant corporation for years ac-
quiesced in the management of the corporation by Nephi 
Hansen, and they are ·estopped to assert any lack of 
authority, and that they held out to the public generally 
and to this defendant that they were not concerned or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
interested in the corporation or in its business or affairs, 
and that Nephi Hansen had absolute authority to act on 
behalf of the corporation including the right to sell and 
mortgage its real property; that the defendant corpora-
tion represented to defendant William L. Hansen that 
there was a regularly constituted de jure board of di-
rectors properly selected and qualified, and that they 
unanimously adopted a resolution authorizing the sale 
to the defendant of the property, and that the property 
was sold to the defendant, William L. Hansen, for 
$10,000.00 cash and the assumption of a $75,000.00 mort-
gage; that the Granite Holding Company still retains 
the money and has made no tender of it to the defend-
ant, nor have the plaintiffs; that the property was in a 
dilapidated and run down condition, and that defendant 
has put in approximately $20,000.00 additional of his 
own money, and that it will be necessary to expend 
another $100,000.00 in order to make the property self-
supporting, (T. 54, et. seq.). The defendant, Granite 
Holding Company, and Nephi J. Hansen also set up 
that· the plaintiff, Lewis F. Hansen, was one of the di-
rectors who consummated the transaction; that W. V. 
Jensen and Mrs. J. E. Jensen, plaintiffs, have only a 
representative interest through J. E. Jensen, a director, 
who participated in the transaction and voted affirma-
tively for the delivery of the deed; that the transaction 
was regular, and that the plaintiffs are estopped to ques-
tion the deed. 
The amended complaint was signed with the name 
of LeGrand Backman as one of the attorneys for the 
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plaintiff~. ('T. 32). LeGrand Baclanan never was an at-
torney for plaintiffs, (T. 1±7, 148), and before the case 
crune on for trial Lewis Hansen withdrew as a plaintiff 
and Benjamin Spence withdrew as his attorney, and E. C. 
J€nsen was entered as counsel for the plaintiffs, (T. 74, 
75, 76). Prior to the trial defendants, Granite Holding 
CDmpany, and Nephi J. Hansen, served notice that they 
would ask to amend their answers so as to deny that the 
plaintiffs as then constituted were stockholders in the 
Granite Holding Company, (T. 78). During the trial 
(June 22, 1948, three years after the deed) it appeared 
that the plaintiff, Robert Young, had been dead for years 
before the filing of the complaint, and that William S. 
Young is the distributee of the stock of Robert Young, 
(T. 274), and the complaint was thereupon amended dur-
ing the trial to show William S. Young as a party plain-
tiff instead of Robert Young, (T. 280). Later on Decem-
ber 16, 1948, and after the trial was ended .J. R. Jensen 
and W. ·v. Jensen moved for an order dismissing them 
as plaintiffs in the action, (T. 102), and on the same day 
these persons were dismissed as plaintiffs, (T. 101). 
The heading of the motion reciting the names of the 
plaintiffs states Mrs. J. R. Jensen, whereas all the other 
pleadings refer to her as Mrs. J. E. Jensen which is 
correct. While the motion itself and the order of dis-
missal refer to some person named J. R. Jensen, there 
never was any one in the case named J. R. Jensen. Ap-
parently, counsel at that late date did not know who his 
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clients were, and as a matter of fact during the trial the 
following occurred: 
"MR. JENSEN, (counsel for plaintiffs): Your 
honor, I notice that the complaint, or the 
amended complaint, rather, which I didn't 
draw, for the record, shows Robert Young as 
a plaintiff. Of course, Robert Young is dead, 
and I don't think that is proper plaintiff. 
Dead man can't sue. 
''THE COURT: Wbich one of these men hired 
you. 
"MR. JONES: These plaintiffs are like the 
weather. 
"MR. JENSEN: I refuse to answer." ( R. 279). 
So of the two original plaintiffs who started the 
action one was joined without his authority and with-
drew immediately, while the other was a director who 
affirmatively approved the deed in question. The later 
plaintiffs, two of them, W. V. Jensen and Mrs. J. E. 
Jensen, were not stockholders at all and one was the son 
and the other the wife of the director J. E. Jensen who 
voted for the deed is question. These two were appar-
ently later dismissed as plaintiffs, while the plaintiff, 
Robert Young, was dead and never did join as a plain-
tiff, and his son, William S. Young, was substituted dur-
ing the trial. The plaintiffs were in a constant state 
of flux, joining and then withdrawing, some with no capa-
city whatever, others affirmative participants in the con-
veyance of the property sought by such participants to 
be voided on the ground of alleged fraud which they 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
- themselYes had perpetrated. "Then the action was finish-
ed, none of the original plaintiffs remained, neither of 
the attorneys who sig-ned the complaint were in the case, 
those who started the action had disappeared, and it was 
carried on by others who entered the picture nearly three 
years after the deed had been given and the property 
transferred, (T. 7-1:). Plaintiffs never did bring the case 
on for trial. All they did was file a harassing action and 
let it rest there. The case was brought on for trial only 
upon motion and demand of the defendant, Granite 
Holding Company. (T. 52). Tt may be that plaintiffs 
were unable to determine who they were or who was 
their attorney, they were in and out and shifting around 
so frequently. 
II. THE TESTIMONY 
PLAINTIFF's WITNESSES 
(A l The Validity of the Deed 
The plaintiffs offered in evidence the Clerk's file of 
the original articles and the various amendments and 
oaths of office of the defendant, Granite Holding Com-
pany, (Exhibit "A", T. 144). These articles show that 
originally the company was called the Granite Lumber 
Company at the time of its incorporation in 1901; that 
the name was changed to Granite Holding Company in 
1927. Originally the corporation had 200 shares of the 
par value of $100.00 each. Nephi J. Hansen, the defend-
ant herein, and Joseph E. Jensen, one of the directors 
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'who authorized the deed to the defendant, W. L. Hansen, 
were two of the five original incorporators in 1901 and 
apparently continued as directors during the entire per-
iod under consideration up to 1945. The articles were 
amended in 1919 to provide for 3500 shares of common 
stock and 3500 shares of preferred stock. Nephi J. Han-
sen was then president of the company. In 1927 thc> 
articles were amended, as above indicated, to change the 
name to Granite Holding Company, and at that time 
under the required "Statement of Domestic Corpo.:.·a-
tion" the corporation represented that Nephi J. Hansen 
was the president and general manager, Joseph E. Jen-
sen, the vice-president, and Clyde Hansen the treasurer, 
and that at that time all of the common stock, to-wit, 3500 
shares and 7 40 shares of the preferred stock were sub-
scribed and apparently issued. Only in the event divi-
dends on the preferred stock were not paid for three con-
secutive years did the preferred stock have any voting 
power and then only one vote for each share of stock. 
In 1932 the State of Utah forfeited the charter of the 
corporation for non-payment of license taxes. 
From the beginning the articles have provided by 
article 9 that there shall he a general manager appointed 
by the board of directors to hold his position at the plea-
sure of the hoard, and by article 12 that the board of 
directors in their discretion ''and without notice to or 
authority from the stockholders" shall have power "to 
sell, mortgage, exchange, assign or dispose of, in any 
way or n1anner they may deem best, any or all the real 
and personal property of the corporation.'' Article 11 
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has always provided that the board of directors are 
authorized to fill all vacancies in the board of directors 
occurring from any cause whatever, and that any di-
rector including the persons so appointed shall serve 
until the next annual election and until his successor is 
elected and qualified. 
The plaintiffs produced ten witnesses, six of whom 
were stockholders-Hettie ~fay Bates, Clyde F. Hansen, 
:Mary Hansen Southwick, William S. Young, Ralph Cut-
ler and Lewis F. Hansen. Keith Bates, a son of Hettie 
:Jiay Bates, also testified, apparently as the representa-
tive of his mother. 
~Irs. Bates testified that she is the owner of 50 
shares of the preferred stock, issued to her in 1921, 
(Exhibit "B", T. 149), and that she is the widow of 
Ephraim Bates, who was the owner of 55 shares of pre-
ferred stock, (Exhibit "C", T. 150). There is no way 
of determining whether or not she is the owner of the 
55 shares, Exhibit "C ", except her conclusion and no 
way of determining when the endorsement on the back 
of the shares was made. We objected to the introduction 
of Exhibit "C", and it was received over our objection, 
('T. 153). It should not be considered. 
Mrs. Bates testified that she had never received any 
reports or information at all about the condition or 
affairs of the company at any time since she has been a 
stockholder; that she never had notice of meetings, and 
that she never knew anything about any sale or pro-
posed sale of the property at 21st South and Hyland 
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Drive (11th East) ; that it was just recently that she 
learned that it had been sold, and that was about a year 
ago. She learned of it from Mr. Vivian Jensen. She has 
never had any information with respect to the financial 
condition of the defendant corporation or of any of its 
properties, nor of any change in directors, nor any in-
formation of any kind, nature or description with I'C-
spect to any of the affairs of Granite Holding Company 
since 1921, ( T. 155), although she has resided in Salt 
Lake City all of the time and has had the same address 
since 1923. Her husband, Ephraim Bates, the record 
owner of Exhibit "C", died 17 years ago, (T. 155, 156). 
She has known Nephi J. Hansen personally, but only on 
one occasion since she got her stock has she ever spoken 
to Mr. Hansen. The stock she has was given to her by 
her husband. Hhe never knew any of the officers or di-
rectors of the company. She knew the company was 
located in Sugarhouse, but she didn't know what it did 
nor what property it owned, nor what business it was 
engaged in, and never knew anything about it at all, 
(T. 157, 158). The only persons she ever inquired about 
concerning the company was from Mr. Rob Young 
after her husband died, but she can't remember what the 
inquiry was about, and D. E. Judd, here brother-in-law, 
of the Utah Savings & Trust, (T. 160). She never went 
to the company's place of business and never communi-
cated with the company, never attended a stockholders' 
meeting, never knew anything about the affairs of the 
company, and never tried to find out anything from 
the company itself about its affairs, and never pro-
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tested to any officers of the company about her lack of 
inforn1ation or notice of meetings or the conduct of the 
business of the company. There was nothing so far as 
she knew that was any different in the sale in 1945 than 
in other sales of property that had been 1nade. She knew 
X ephi Hansen and she tmderstood that he was the owner 
of Granite Holding Company. She never asked Mr. 
Hansen anything about the company, (T. 161, 162). :Mr. 
Vivian Jensen is the one ·who solicited her to be a 
plaintiff in this action. She doesn't know whether or not 
the property was about to be sold or whether it had 
been sold. She didn't tell him to file suit. He and her 
son, Keith, went ahead and made her a party, but she 
was willing for them to do so, (T. 164). She received 
dividends for two or three years, but for at least the last 
17 years has never received nor made any inquiry. 
She was told that the company was bankrupt and she 
couldn't get anything. Her brother told her this, ( T. 
167). The only other stockholders she talked to about 
the company was Mr. Rob Young, and he didn't seem 
to know much about it, (T. 168, 169). 
Keith Bates, son of the foregoing witness, testified 
that in May of 1947, nearly two years after W. L. Hansen 
took over the property, a meeting of the stockholders 
t whom they could locate was held in the home of Vivian 
~ Jensen in Salt Lake City. Clyde Hansen was there, and 
L. F. Hansen, both of whom he understood to be di-
rectors of Granite Holding Company, (T. 170). 'They 
asked if the sale of the property in question had been 
made and they stated it had; that the consideration was 
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$8500.00 or $10,000.00 which had been paid to the corpor-
ation cr. 173). Clyde stated that he didn't know wha;t 
was done with the money. L. F. Hansen didn't say any-
thing, (T. 176). Clyde told them that they were off on 
the wrong track, there was nothing there ( T. 177). Vivian 
Jensen called the meeting, and his mother authorized 
him to act in her name. This was the first time he had 
heard about the sale of the property. He knew his mother 
had been a stockholder for years, (T. 178), and that he 
had heard rumors of other sales. He knows nothing about 
the other sales, ( T. 178, 179). 
Clyde F. Hansen testified that he was the secretary 
and director of Granite Holding Company until January 
12, 1948. He was secr·etary and director on July 18, 1945 
and had been a director since 1924. Nephi J. Hansen 
is his father and president of the Granite Holding Com-
pany. Laura F. Hansen is his mother, and she was a 
director of the Granite Holding Company at the time the 
sale was made. Mary H. Southwick is his sister, and she 
was a director at the time the sale was made. L. F. Han-
sen, plaintiff, is his brother and he was a director at 
the time the sale was made. Hooper Knowlton, another 
director, is a real estate man in Sugarhouse. He is 
around forty years old, and is a tenant of his fathers 
and is in business in Sugar house. Joseph E. Jensen was 
a director and a resident of Sugarhouse, and he is now 
dead. He died about two years ago, and he was an 
employee of his father right from the time the business 
was started, (T. 181, 182). There were several meetings 
of the directors at the company office around July 18, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
19-±5. He wrote the 1ninutes of the 1neeting of July 18th 
(T. 181. 182). These minutes are Exhibit 'D", (T. 183), 
which was received in evidence, (T. 200). These minutes 
are as follows: 
•' :JfiNP'TES OF THg l\I E~ETING 
OF 
DIRECTORS OF 
GRANITE HOLDING CO~IP ANY 
''A meeting of the Board of Directors of 
Granite Holding Company was held July 18, 1945, 
at 6:00 P .. M. at the office of the company, 2108 
South 11th East, Salt Lake City, after due notice 
and upon call of the president. 
''All members of the board, there being only 
four, were present, the same being Nephi J. Han-
sen, president and director; Clyde F. Hansen, 
secretary and director; L. F. Hansen, director, 
and Joseph E. Jensen, director. President Han-
sen presided and Secretary Hansen acted as 
secretary of the meeting. 
"The president announced that the purpose 
of the meeting was to fill vacancies in the Board 
of Directors. Thereupon, upon motion of Di-
rector Nephi J. Hansen, seconded by Director 
Clyde F. Hansen, the following persons were 
elected and appointed to the office of director 
to hold office until the next annual election or 
until their successors are elected and qualified; 
Hooper Knowlton, Mary H. Southwick, and Laura 
F. Hansen. All directors thereupon signed the 
oath of office and were declared directors of the 
company, including those newly elected. 
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''The president announced the purpose of the 
meeting was to dispose of the company's pro-
perty, consisting of the real estate and buildings 
located at 21st South and 11th East (Highland 
Drive), Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the exist-
ing mortgage in favor of the Beneficial Life In-
surance Company. President Hansen stated that 
the company had an opportunity to realize the 
substantial amount of approximately $10,000.00 
for said property over and above the mortgage. 
The president gave a brief history of operations 
since the depression, and stated that all stores 
between the Granite Mart and the Theatre build-
ing had been sold to reduce the mortgage. 
''After a discussion upon motion of Director 
Hooper Knowlton, seconded by Director Laura 
F. Hansen, the following resolution was unani-
mously adopted: 
"RESOLVED, That the company's property 
at 21st South and 11th East (Highland Drive), 
Salt Lake City, Utah, consisting of all of its real 
estate and buildings at said location, be sold sub-
ject to the existing mortgage in favor of Benefi-
cial Life Insurance Company for not less than 
$10,000.00 over and above the present amount due 
on the mortgage, taxes to be prorated as of date 
of deed, and that the president and secretary be 
authorized to issue warranty deed as aforesaid 
to the purchaser and to receive payment therefor, 
the amount of the company's taxes, the revenue 
stamps, and legal expenses, to be deducted from 
and credited upon the amount to be received for 
the property. 
''AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, 
That $5,000.00 be paid to President Nephi J. Han-
sen in full for back salary heretofore authorized 
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by the Board of Directors but never paid to or 
collected by President Hansen, and that said 
sum be deducted frmn the amount received upon 
the purchase of said property. 
''There being no further business to perform, 
upon motion duly made and seconded the meeting 
adjourned.'' 
(s) CLYDE F. HANSEN 
8 ecretary an.d Director 
GRANITE HOLDING CO:MPANY 
(s) NEPHI J. HANSEN 
President and Director 
(s) HOOPER KNOWLTON 
Director 
(s) LAURA F. HANSEN 
{s) JOSEPH E. JENSEN 
Directo.r 
(s) :JIARY H. SOUTHWICK 
D1irector 
(s) L. F. HANSEN 
Director 
There were several meetings held just about that time 
and prior to that within about a month, but prior to 
that there hadn't been any meetings for a long time, (T. 
183). At the time of this meeting there were several 
vacancies in the board. The first thing done was to fill 
the vacancies. The directors present before the vacan-
cies were Nephi J. Hansen, Clyde F. Hansen, Lewis F. 
Hansen and Joseph E. Jensen, and at that meeting there 
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were added to the board Hooper Knowlton, Mary H. 
Southwick and Laura F. Hansen, who executed their 
oaths of office at that time, ( T. 184). There was no one 
present besides these seven directors. Mr. Rawlings 
was not there. Mr. Jones was not there, nor was William 
L. Hansen there. William L. Hansen never was present 
at any directors' meetings (T. 419). At that time the 
company was the owner of the property at the south-
west corner of 21st South and Highland Drive. (T. 184, 
185). On the ground floor are located n1any store rooms, 
and it is a two-story building in the main building where 
a number of apartments are located, something around 
24, ( T. 186, 187). There was a mortgage on the property 
of around $74,500.00 with the Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company which as near as he can remember originally 
was for $82,500.00 in 1941 after the sale of some other 
parcels of property that the mortgage had formerly 
covered, (T. 187). Previously the Granite Holding Com-
pany had owned all the property now held by the South-
east Furniture Company, and also owned the property 
on 21st South now owned by the Granite Mart and west 
of the property in question, and those properties were 
sold off and arrangements were made with the Beneficial 
for partial releas·es, and the mortgages in that way 
dropped down, ( T. 187, 188). There were no books or 
records of the company under his supervision. The 
records had all been lost before he became secretary. 
He had no books and records. The company had some 
income by way of rentals, but the company had no pay-
roll, (T. 189). He signed the deed to William L. Hansen 
.V 
UCI 
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as secretary of the company. Whenever property was 
transferred that's about the only time he came into the 
picture to sign as the secretary. He had signed as 
serretary for other transfers before the one in question, 
(T. 190). 
After the election of the additional directors in July 
1~)-t-:l, the director~ proceeded with the business of the sale 
of property in question which was all of the remaining 
property of the Granite Holding Cmnpany to \Yilliam L. 
Hansen. He had previously talked to William L. Han-
sen about the sale and to his father on numerous occa-
sions. This was not the first time that the matter had 
been brought to the attention of the board of directors. 
He had talked to the board on previous occasions, that is 
the four people who were then directors. He signed the 
minutes which contained a resolution authorizing him 
as secretary and the president as president to execute 
a deed for the sale of this property. Everyone knew that 
the purchaser was William L. Hansen, although anybody 
could have bought it then, and they asked Nephi J. Han-
sen to see if there was a possibility of other sales, and 
he reported that there wasn't and this was the best 
deal he could get. William L. Hansen was the only per-
son interested in the purchase of that property, (T. 193). 
He doesn't recall the date the deed was executed, al-
though the date, July 16, appears on the deed which was 
not recorded until July 28. It contains the signature of 
his father as president and acknowledgment before 
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Hooper Knowlton that it was executed on July 16, (T. (r.~ 
194). He doesn't remember the deal as having been con- W~ pr 
summated that way, that is the deed on the 16th and the 
meeting on the 18th, (T. 195). (Later Mr. Clyde Hansen 
testified that the date of either the deed or resolution 
was wrong because the deed was signed after the board 
had adopted the resolution, ( T. 285). tSo there must be 
a mistake in the deed, (T. 287). The resolution recites 
that $5,000.00 of the $10,000.00 was to be paid to Nephi 
J. Hansen as back salary.) (No one disputed and there is 
nothing in the record that this was not a just debt of 
the company to Nephi Hansen). The board took his 
father's statement that the company owed him that 
much, and he, the witness, knew what his father had been 
getting and what the board of directors had formerly 
authorized him to take. 'The other $5,000.00 he doesn't 
know definitely what became of it, although he knows 
part of it went for expenses and taxes which had to be 
taken care of. The deal contemplated the proration of 
the taxes between the buyer and the seller, (T. 196, 199). 
(Exhibit 5 shows that none of the second $5,000.00 went 
for taxes). His father made all the deposits which were 
checked out on his father's signature, and always have 
been. On his father's signature alone the money could 
be checked out, ( T. 201). 
Exhibit "E" is the deed transferring the property 
from Granite Holding Company to William L. Hans·en, 
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(T. 201). Exhibit ''E", elin1inating the description of 
the property, reads as follows: 
''"\YARRANTY DEED 
"GR~~NITE HOLDING COlVfPANY, a Utah 
corporation, grantor of Salt Lake City, County 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY'S 
and "\V~~RRANTS to WILLIA~I L. HANSEN, 
grantee of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, for the sum of TEN and noj100 
( $10.00) Dollars and other good and valuable con-
sideration, the following described tract of land 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
* * * * 
''Subject to a Renewal Mortgage in fa-
vor of Beneficial Life Insurance Company 
dated November 1, 1941, recorded November 
10, 1941 in the office of the County Recorder, 
Salt Lake County, Book 292, Page 31. 
'' 1945 Taxes to be prorated. 
"WITNESS the hand of said grantor, this 
16th day of July, A. D. 1945 by its proper officers 
thereunto duly authorized. 
GRANITE HOLDING COMPANY 
By N. J. HANSEN 
ATTEST: Pr,esident 
CLYDE F. HANSEN 
Secretary 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ss. 
COUN'TY OF SALT LAKE ) 
"On the 16th day of July, A. D. 1945 person-
ally appeared before me Nephi J. Hansen and 
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Clyde F. Hansen who being first duly sworn did 
say: That they are the President and Secretary 
respectively of Granite Holding Company, a cor-
poration, and that said instrument was signed 
in behalf of said corporation by authority of a 
resolution of its Board of Directors and said 
Nephi J. Hansen and Clyde F. Hansen aclmowl-
edged to me that said corporation executed the 
same. 
(SEAL) 
HOOPER KNOWLTON 
N-o t·ary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, 
Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
February 28, 1948'' 
The signatures are those of his father and himself. The 
deed shows it was recorded July 28, 1945. 
The witness testified that he gave the minutes, Ex-
hibit "D", to Mr. Jones, the attorney for William L. 
Hansen, and at that time it was signed by all the di-
rectors ( T. 422). W. L. Hansen, as it will appear from 
his testimony, got the deed from Clyde and then author-
ized Mr. Jones to pay the first $5,000 to Nephi Hansen 
which was done upon receipt of the resolution, (T. 314). 
There had been a meeting on July 11 at which the whole 
proposition was discussed and decided, and there was a 
meeting on the 16th when the same matter was discussed. 
The minutes, Exhibit "D", were first taken in his own 
handwriting in long-hand and then transcribed, and all 
~~~ 
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matter was discussed. He doesn't remember when the 
deed was delivered to ,V. L. Hansen, but it was sometime 
a week or so after the date of it and after the meeting 
of the board of directors and after it was signed. 
The witness then identified Exhibit 1 which bears 
the signatures of his father and Lon Fisher with which 
he is familiar. and contains a resolution of the board of 
directors of Granite Holding Company which has never 
been rescinded. The exhibit was receiv·ed in evidence, 
('T. 205). Exhibit 1 is the minutes of a special meeting 
of the board of directors of Granite Holding Company 
held ~Iay 15, 1939, at which all five directors were either 
present or had executed waivers and consent for all busi-
ness to be transacted. At that time the minutes recite 
that the president reported on the condition of the pro-
perty, and that it was desirable to liquidate as much of 
the real estate as possible and apply the proceeds to the 
Beneficial Life mortgage. A resolution was adopted that 
the president and secretary be authorized "to proceed at 
once to sell all or any part of the real property and 
premises of this corporation, at either public or private 
sale, upon the best terms obtainable, and they are hereby 
authorized to make, execute and deliver any and all 
necessary and proper deeds, contracts, and other instru-
ments in order to consummate such sale on behalf of this 
corporation, and any such sale made by them as herein 
provided shall be final and binding upon this corpora-
tion.'' The resolution further provided that all proceeds 
from any sales shall be applied on the mortgage of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
Beneficial Life. After this resolution Granite Holding 
Company sold property in Sugarhouse to the Southeast 
Furniture Company which is the property next south 
to the one in question. That property was the last build-
ing built, and the construction was better than it was 
on any of the other buildings. The floor space would be 
greater than the property sold to William L. Hansen. 
An offer was made by counsel for defendant, William L. 
Hansen, to show by this witness sales of all the remaining 
property of the Granite Holding Company from a period 
starting August 11, 1939, down to March 20, 1942, for the 
exact amount of the mortgage, and that the Granite Hold-
ing Company received none of these sums except by way 
of credit on the mortgage. This offer the court refused, 
(T. 209). 
The witness has been familiar with the property 
of Granite Holding Company ever since 1923 or 1924, 
and all that time his father has managed it, and he never 
recalls a stockholders' meeting or a directors' meeting in 
recent years except when necessary further to satisfy the 
mortgage. His father handled the bank accounts, paid 
the rent, paid the interest on the mortgage, and so far 
as he knows there were never any inquiries by any stock-
holders over the years about the way the business was 
run, (T. 210, 211). There were never any objections 
about his father selling the property, and there were a 
number of sales. The physical condition of the property 
in question when it was sold to William L. Hansen was 
bad. The buildings on the corner were built in 1900, 
and it was a common occurrence for his father to have 
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to pay for some stock that was ruined because of water 
leaking and pipes breaking. The next building was built 
in about 1916, and the third building was built a little 
later. They were all very badly run down. The Granite 
Holding Con1pany was in bad financial condition-the 
payments on the mortgage were not kept up. The income 
was not sufficient at all to keep up the expenses of 
operating the property including the interest on the 
mortgage. There wasn't any money to keep up the pay-
ments on the mortgage, (T. 212, 214). 
At this point an episode occurred which indicated 
to us that the trial court had already determined his de-
cision in this case. The witness had stated that the com-
pany simply didn't have the money to keep up the pro-
perty. This was objected to, and the court made the fol-
lowing observation, ( T. 215) : 
"THE COURT: I think the objection ought to 
be sustained. I don't want to limit counsel in 
getting information before me. Some infer-
ence might be had about irregularities in this 
quick sale, filling vacancies, and so forth, and 
I let some in, but this detail here doesn't in-
terest me. I don't think it will help me any. 
"l\IR .. JO~ES: Is Your Honor's ruling based 
upon the ground of conclusion? 
''THE COURT: All grounds stated by counsel. 
"MR. JONES: If it is on the ground that it is 
not proper cross examination, that is one 
thing. 
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"THE COURT: All ground~ ~·ou can think of 
now and all grounds he can think of between 
now and the end of the appeal, Mr .• Jones. 
"~lR. JONES: Because J intend to renew the 
question in the nmin case because I don't 
think it is a conclusion. 
''THE COURT: As to why they didn't have 
money enough or why they didn't pay that, 
I don't care to hear nwre of that, if there is 
any way to avoid it, and by seizing on his 
objection I can at this time." 
There had been no evidence and no inference can be 
drawn from the evidence that there was a quick sale or 
irregularities, and the court indicated he wasn't inter-
ested at all in why the company had to sell this property, 
whether it was in financial distress or not, and that he 
expected us to have to appeal from his decision. 
"MR. JONES, (continuing),: Well, how long had 
this deal been under consideration. The court 
just made a statement about a quick sale. 
How long had this deal been under considera-
tion for the sale of this corner1 
"A.: About two months at least. 
'''THE COURT: The statement I made, Mr. 
Jones, was a quick sale after the appoint-
ment of the three additional directors.'' 
There was no quick sale after the appointment of the 
three additional directors. The matter had been dis-
cussed for weeks. 
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Plaintiffs next called the defendant, William L. Han-
sen, who testified that he was furnished· an operating 
statement of the revenues and expense8 and financial 
statement of the Granite Holding Con1pany for the years 
1943, 1944 and 1945, and that his father made up these 
statements. They were received in evidence as Exhibits 
2, 3 and 4, (T. 216). These exhibits show that in 1943 
with nothing allowed for depreciation or renovation 
and payments on principal not fully met, the property 
produced only $41.7 4 n1ore than the bare actual 'ex-
penses; that in 1944 the revenue was $527.30 more than 
the bare expenses, and in 1945 for the first four months 
the revenue was $115.80 less than the bare expenses. So 
for the 28 months in 1943, 1944 and 1945 the property' 
produced $453.24 with no provision whatever for depre-
ciation, replacement, renovations, and with constantly in-
creasing deficiences on the mortgage payments. These 
exhibits also show the names of the tenants, the dimen-
sions of the property, and the date the buildings were 
constructed, to-wit, 1900, 1907, 1909 and 1917. These 
exhibits were offered and received without objection. It 
appears from them that in the 28 months in 1943, 1944 
and 1945, that the company paid in salaries for 1943 
$1864.00, or approximately $155.00 a month; in 1944 
$2266.00, or $188.00 a month; and in 1945 for the four 
months $127 4.00 .a it , or $318.00 or an average for 
the period of $204.00 per month and a total amount for 
salaries of $5404.12. It already appears that there was 
no payroll, and Nephi Hansen was the only one receiving 
anything from the corporation, and his salary, as we have 
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thus shown, averaged $204.00 a nwnth. It appears thus 
from the plaintiff's case that the company was paying a 
management fee of $204.00 a month as the necessary ex-
pense under its own management. This is important in 
considering the action of the court in refusing to allow 
William L. Hansen anything paid his father or for his 
own management and all the advantages that accrued to 
the property as a result thereof. 
Mr. W. L. Hansen further testified at a later time a~ 
a part of plaintiffs' case that early in 1945 he had a con-
versation with members of his family about the Foot-
hills Development property, a different property than 
the one in question, and that the Sugarhouse property 
was mentioned only incidentally. The discussion was 
with reference to dividing up the Foothill Development 
property between Sid Mullcock and Lincoln Hansen and 
the possibility of getting some of that property for the 
family, ( T. 304, 305). At that time the witness made a 
suggestion to his brother, Lew, (plaintiff, L. F. Hansen), 
that L·ew go down to Sugarhouse and spend a little time 
and see what could he worked out with respect to the 
Sugarhouse property, which Lew did. Lew reported 
back that there was no value in the Sugarhouse property, 
and he would much prefer th~ .. Foothills Development 
property, (T. 306, 307). Witness was also interested 
in securing a part of the Foothills Development property. 
His father sugges~d that he, the witness, do something 
about the Sugarhouse property, and that he buy it. 
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The witness got the deed to the Sugarhouse pro-
perty. but it was not until after the sale, when he saw 
the Ininutes. that he lmderstood that his father got 
$5,000.00 of the purchase price of the Sugarhouse pro-
perty, (T. 308). ~lfter the sale he was shown the minutes 
which had been approved, but he had no such under-
standing prior to that time. His only understanding 
about his father prior to the sale was that he would try 
to put the property upon a paying basis, and if he 
could, he would give his father a job. As far as the allo-
cation of the down payment, he had nothing to do with 
it. The original check for $5,000.00 was given at the time 
of the delivery of the deed, and he had no understand-
ing whatsoever with regard to the operation of the Gran-
ite Holding Company or anything about the $5,000.00 
down payment. He knew nothing about the action of 
the board of directors, ('T. 309). All he knew about the 
financial condition of the company were the statements 
up to "Jiay of 1945, which had been made up from the 
check stubs in his father's possession and with his 
father's help. There was no talk then of the purchase of 
the property, (T. 310). He regarded the Granite Holding 
Company as his father's company, and the Sugarhouse 
property was the last of the properties Granite Holding 
Company had accumulated in all the years in Sugar-
house. His father built the company, and it was his under-
standing that he owned most of the stock. He felt free to 
deal with his father with respect to the property if the 
same was approved by a resoll!ti_on 9f the board of direc-
tors, ( T. 311). When the deed was delivered, he gave the 
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check for $5,000.00 but did not get a copy of the resolu-
tion at that time. He did not receive the deed and did not 
have possession of the deed until the day it was recorded. 
He recorded thP deed the same day. The check is Exhibit 
"G'' and is dated July 27, 1945, to Granite Holding Com-
pany for $5,000.00, and is endorsed Granite Holding 
Company. He delivered the check to Mr. Jones who de-
livered it to Nephi Hansen, (T. 312, 314). The deed was 
delivered to the witness from the secretary of the com-
pany, Clyde F. Hansen, and the witness notified Mr. 
Jones to deliver the check. At that time he had not 
seen the resolution, but he insisted upon a resolution of 
the board of directors. He assumed that the board of 
directors had been filled, but he had no idea who was 
going on the board, and he didn't talk to his father about 
filling up the board except that it would be necessary to 
have a complete board, (T. 316, 318). The endorsement 
on the back of Exhibit "G", the check, looks like his 
father's. The check cleared through the witness's ac-
count in the Yellowstone Banking Company, and he 
parted with the money represented by it which was 
actually paid to the company, and he knows nothing about 
where it went afterwards. Exhibit" G" was received and 
offered in evidence, (T. 320). Witness paid another 
$5,000.00, and since he went into the property he spent 
better than $14,000.00 more of his own money and about 
three years of work for which he has taken nothing, 
(T. 320). Exhibit~n!ijied by the witness which 
is a check for the · r\5,000.00 of the purchase 
price, dated December 26, 1945, and to which is attached 
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a staten1ent of Decen1ber 28, 1945, being a receipt from 
Granite Holding Company for the purchase price in 
fnll, and fr01n the second $5,000.00 are deducted items 
which "\Y. L. Hansen had paid which were the o bliga-
tions of the Granite Holding Company in the amount 
of $1219.76. Nothing frmn the purchase price was ap-
plied to payment of taxes, the taxes having already been 
set aside by the Beneficial Life from the payments made 
on the mortgage by the Granite Holding Company. The 
second check is for $3,780.24 which with the $1,219.76 al-
ready paid by W. L. Hansen makes the total of $5,000.00. 
This check is also endorsed Granite Holding Company 
in his father's handwriting. The check cleared through 
his bank account at Sugarhouse and came out of his 
funds, and he parted with the full $5,000.00, and he 
received no return of cash from either payment, (T. 321, 
322). Exhibit 5 is also endorsed Granite Holding Com-
pany and initialed "N.J. H." in, he thinks, his father's 
handwriting, (T. 323). He is not familiar with the 
Granite Holding Company. The exhibit 5 was received 
in evidence, (T. 324). He had nothing to do with filling 
the board of directors of the Granite Holding Company. 
He has never been a stockholder or a director of the 
Granite Holding Company or had anything whatsoever 
to do with it. He paid everything he thought the property 
was worth, and the Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 represent to the 
best of his ability the information as to the actual income 
and expenses of the property before he bought it, (T. 
325). 
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W. L. Hansen also testified later that he was 
never at any meeting at his father's house when he made 
the statement that all he wanted was to save the pro-
perty for the family. He never made any such state-
ment, nor was he at any n1eeting of the family when 
Lew said that he (Lew) wanted to save the property 
for the stockholders. ''Lew has never been interested 
in saving for the stockholders.'' He was never present 
on any occasion when Lew ever protested his purchase 
of the property, (T. 433, 434). 
Mary Hansen Southwick was called by the plaintiffs 
and testified that she is the daughter of Nephi Hansen 
and that she attended several meetings; that she signed 
Exhibit '' D''; that she acted as a director because her 
father requested her to; that she was a director and 
had a share of stock. She assumes that it came from her 
father as her father owned most of the stock of the 
corporation. She recalls the occasion when the matter 
of the sale of the property to William was discussed 
which she had heard of prior to that time. There were 
two or three meetings. Her father was getting along 
towards 80. They were worried about him and felt 
that he had too much to carry and something ought to 
be done to relieve him, (T. 262). She knew that they 
were considering selling the property to William; that 
her father was having a time paying the mortgage and 
interest, and that he needed help. She doesn't remember 
whether her mother was at the meeting or not, but she 
would recognize her mother's signature if she would 
see it. The sale of the property was discussed with 
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her nwther. Her n1emory is indistinct because she didn't 
have any occasion to remember any of these matters. 
She never thought that any of these matters would be 
questioned, ( T. 263, 26-!). 
Willian1 S. Young testified that he is the son of 
Robert Young, named as a plaintiff, who in his lifetime 
was a stockholder of Granite Holding Company, and 
that he, the witness, is now the owner of Robert Young's 
stock by virtue of a decree of distribution; that said 
stock amounts to 45 shares of preferred stock. Counsel 
for plaintiff stated that he had the certificates bearing 
the endorsement of the administrator of the estate of 
Robert Young, and that there is a decree of distribution 
distributing the stock to the witness. 
''MR. JENSEN: * * *Is that true~ 
"~IR. JONES: \V ell, you say there is. I have 
never seen it. 
"~IR JENSEN: \Veil, I haven't seen it either, 
but Mr. Young was one of the administrators, 
and he tells me-was there such a decree, 
Mr. Young~ 
"A. Yes. :\fr. P. H. Neeley of Coalville can 
furnish all that." ( T. 27 4, 275). 
That is all there is as to this witness or his father being 
a stockholder. Witness stated that he had known Nephi 
J. Hansen since 1918, and that from time to time he has 
talked with him. He used to meet him on the streets 
in Sugar house; that he met him in the early part of 
August, 1945, after this stock was distributed to him, 
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because Nephi Hansen had contacted the witness's sister 
to get in touch with him. He went to Mr. Hansen's of-
fice on Hightland Drive and they talked about different 
things. The conversation was objected to and sustained 
as to "'\Villiam L. Hansen, ( T. 27 6) . 'The witness said 
Mr. Hansen offered some holdings in Parley's Canyon 
in lieu of witness's stock in Granite Holding Company, 
and the witness told him he wasn't interested. The 
witness asked hin1 if he were ever going to receive any-
thing, and :J[ r. Hansen did not answer the questic:1. 
He didn't tell Mr. Young that he had disposed of the 
property on 21st South and Highland Drive. Witness 
didn't tell l\Ir. Hansen anything about being a stock-
holder. He had his stock with him, but didn't show it 
to l\fr. Hansen, (T. 278). He had a conversation with 
Mr. Hansen in 1946 when Mr. Fay Bates was present. 
This was in his office on Highland Drive. Again this 
was objected to and sustained as toW. L. Hansen. This 
was in the summer of 1946, and they didn't get anything 
out of Mr. Hansen. They told him they wanted to find 
out about the Granite Holding Company, what the 
rentals and revenues were, and he made no reply ex-
cept to say that his salary would eat up everything, and 
he didn't mention the fact that"William L. Hansen had 
purchased the property. At this point the court asked 
plaintiffs' counsel which one of the men hired him, 
and the counsel replied : "I refuse to answer." ( T. 279). 
The witness said he wanted to be made a party plaintiff; 
that he thought all the time he was a party plaintiff, and 
William S. Young was thereupon substituted by the 
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court for Robert Young as a party plaintiff, ( T. 280). 
A little over a year ago Keith Bates told him the pro-
perty had been sold. The witness never got notice of 
stockholders' meeting, never attended a stockholders' 
meeting, never got any information of any sort from the 
company, althought his father knew Nephi J. Hansen 
prior to 1920. They were interested in the Sugarhouse 
Bank together. His father died in 1930. Nothing was 
ever said in either of the foregoing conversations with 
respect to the books or records of the company, and 
witness never asked anything about them. He has been 
the owner of the certificates since 1937, and they were 
in the safety deposit box from 1930 until that date. They 
didn't get around to having the father's estate straight-
ened out until 1934, although he knew the stock was in 
the hox all the time. He and his father had holdings 
in Sugarhouse, and they used to see Mr. Hansen who 
was also interested in the Sugar house Bank, ( T. 282, 
284). Witness only knows in a general way what the 
Granite Holding Company owned in Sugarhouse. He 
understood they owned the Granite Mart, (one of the 
buildings sold by ~Ir. Hansen prior to the present sale). 
Witness wasn't much interested. He thought they owned 
the Southeast Furniture Company. He only knew in a 
general way, (T. 284, 285 ). 'There was never any divi-
dends turned in by his father, and he never saw any 
dividends from the Granite Lumber or Granite Holding 
Company. Nephi J. Hansen ran the Granite Holding 
Company. He didn't know who the directors were ex-
cept Lon Fisher, and he didn't inquire as it was none 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
of his business, (T. 286, 287). The witness evaded 
a direct answer as to whether after his father died he 
ever attempted to find out anything about the Granite 
Holding Company, (T. 287, 288). He never did anything 
about the Granite Holding Company, (T. 289). Nephi 
Hansen was running it, and he let him run it without 
objection as he saw fit. He never knew what his rights 
were in the event dividends were not paid, (T. 289). 
Ralph Cutler was the next witness. He testified that 
he was the owner of 35 shares in the Granite Lumber 
Company, and that he has owned the shares since Octo-
ber 2, 1920, September 16, 1921 and December 4, 1923. 
The certificates are for common stock. He also has 
owned since October 2, 1920, 10 shares of preferred 
stock. He received preferred stock dividends for two 
or three years. He has forgotten the amount of divi-
dends in percentages, (T. 293, 294). He has never been 
informed of any stockholders' meetings, never received 
notice of any stockholders' meetings or actions taken 
by the board of directors, although he was well ac-
quainted with Nephi Hansen and lives in Salt Lake City, 
(T. 294). He has never talked to him about the Holding 
Company. His contacts with Nephi Hansen ceased 
around 1924 or 1925, (T. 295). When the holding com-
pany took over, he often met Mr. Hansen after the in-
surance company, the mortgagees, had taken over the 
property, and he was operating it under their direction. 
This was around 1930 and 1935. He has seen him several 
times but never talked business with him. Last year was 
the first time he heard that the remainder of the pro-
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perty had been disposed of. He is a plaintiff, and his 
name is on the complaint with his consent. After the 
holding company took over, he realized that it had gone 
broke. l\[r. Hansen told him he was operating under the 
direction of those who held the mortgage and was tak-
ing care of the buildings and collected the rents and 
so forth, (T. 295). The witness had the impression the 
property was taken out of l\Ir. Hansen's hands, and he 
was just operating it under the direction of others who 
controlled the property. He never knew the situation 
exactly. l\Ir. Hansen never told him anything. Whenever 
he would ask about the affairs, Mr. Hansen would evade 
a direct answer, although at one time he said: ''If there 
is anything left out of this company, I'm going to see 
that 1ny family gets it.'' This statement was n1ade be'"" 
tween 1930 and 1935 when l\fr. Hansen was in charge of 
the buildings, ('T. 298, 299). He never made any effort 
to remove Mr. Hansen as president. He didn't know any-
body else who held any stock. He felt that his invest-
ment was not a good one and he didn't want it adver-
tised around. He never made any effort to change the 
method of operation of the Granite Holding Company. 
He knew Nephi Hansen was running it and intended to 
run it, (T. 299). Witness just let things slide, (T. 300). 
From the early 20's until the time this property was 
sold in 1945 he made no effort concerning the Granite 
Holding Company to go to stockholders' meetings or 
change the management or control the property. Vivian 
Jensen is the one who contacted him about this action. 
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He hadn't paid any attention to his stock holding until 
Vivian Jensen came to see him, (T. 203). 
Lewis F. Hansen testified for the plaintiff that he 
is a brother of William L. Hansen and was one of the 
original plaintiffs in this action, but that he was dis-
missed as a plaintiff by order of the court; that he was 
one of the board of directors at the time the resolution 
was passed, Exhibit "D", on July 18, 1945. He signed 
the minutes but claimed he signed them four months 
after the date and under protest, (T. 327). He didn't 
know anything about the purchase of the property by 
Bill until after the deed was signed. He had conversa-
tions with Bill before the purchase of the property but 
not about the property, but in the latter part of 1945 
he had a number of conversations and had some diffi-
culties with his brother, and he brought this suit against 
him. There was a meeting at his father's house. At 
that meeting his father and mother were there, his sister 
and her husband, Clyde and himself. That was when 
Bill was trying to get the approval of the family for 
him to take over the property. At this meeting as far 
as he knew the sale had not been consummated. It was 
the same week that the board of directors' meeting to 
discuss it, (T. 329, 330), was held. At this point in the 
testimony Mr. Jensen, attorney for plaintiffs, and the 
witness became confused about which meeting they 
were talking about, and witness stated after examining 
Exhibit "D" that he wasn't at this meeting, but that he 
signed the minutes as indicated thereon under protest 
four or five months later. There was a meeting at Bill's 
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~ house after the resolution of .July 18 wa~ passed when 
the two sisters and three brothers n1et to arbitrate a set-
tlenlent between his brother, Lincoln, and the rest of 
the family. This was after the deed to 'Sugarhouse had 
been given. The witness here changed his mind about 
the meeting and said it was at his father's house, (T. 
332, 333), and that it was before the deed was given. 
The deed wasn't acknowledged on the 16th of July as 
it states. The meeting the witness is now talking about 
took place before the deed was acknowledged, and the 
meeting was on the 14th of July at the folks' house, and 
there were present his two sisters, his brother, Clyde, 
and his brother-in-law, Southwick, himself, his mother 
and his father and Bill, ( T. 334, 335). At this meeting, 
which according to the witness was before the deed was 
delivered or before the resoultion was made, the wit-
ness, although he had already stated that he knew noth-
ing about the transaction until it was consummated, 
stated that Bill had made an off~r on this property and 
at this meeting, he said: "I think we ought to do some-
thing about the stockholders'', and Bill caused more or 
less of a scene, and he thought it was none of the wit-
ness's business about the stockholders; that his father 
had control and could do what he wanted and that was all 
that was said about it, (T. 336). (N~te: the witness, how-
ever, signed the resolution with no reservation contained 
thereon), and continuing the witness stated that he 
signed the minutes, which according to hiin would be 
later, authorizing the sale of the property, and he signed 
them as a member of the board of directors. Several 
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months after Bill took over the property, between three 
and seven months, in Bill's office in Sugarhouse, Bill told 
them that if they didn't leave him alone he was going to 
sell the property. It wasn't long after that that he filed 
the complaint, (T. 337, 338). 
On cross examination the witness stated that he 
was very antagonistic to his brother, admitted that he 
had sued his brother and the jury found in favor of 
his brother, denied that he threatened in Mr. Jones' 
office that if Bill didn't kick Lincoln out of the beer 
parlor located in the Sugarhouse property, that he 
would see that Bill didn't get the property, and denied 
that that was the reason he filed the lawsuit, (T. 340, 
341). There was a formal meeting of the board of di-
rectors in the middle of July. His father and Clyde and 
Knowlton and himself were there, and at that meeting 
they authorized his father to check the possibility of a 
. sale of the Sugar house property. No purchaser or pur-
chase price was mentioned, (T. 342). The court refused 
to allow counsel to test the credibility of this witness on 
his statement that he desired to save the property for 
the stockholders, and the tender was made by Mr. Jones, 
counsel for the defendant, William L. Hansen, to show 
that this witness knew there was nothing in the pro-
perty for the stockholders, and so stated. Even counsel 
for the plaintiffs agreed with the court that such evi-
dence was material, but the court refused to permit it, 
(T. 343, 344). The witness admitted that Bill had offered 
$10,000.00 for the property, and when he said that he 
wanted to save the property for the stockholders, he 
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meant all the stockholders including his father, and that 
it wa:5 for his father ·s protection because he was a heavy 
stockholder, (T. ~1-1-1). The witness had just stated that 
Hooper Knowlton was at the meeting where he, the wit-
ness, was, and the record already shows that Hooper 
~l Knowlton was made a director at the same meeting when 
lil the resolution, Exhibit "D", was adopted. The board 
of directors meeting that he attended was when they 
authorized the father to check into the advisability of 
selling the property and to see what he could obtain, 
That was between the lOth and the 20th of July, and 
the date shown on the deed, July 16, is the day before 
the meeting in Sugarhouse when this authorization to 
the father was made. He was present at the meeting, 
fur 
::~. 
(T. 345). He doesn't recall whether he signed his oath 
of office as a director the same day he signed the min-
utes. He doesn't remember whether he signed them 
both at the same time, and upon being shown his oath 
of office which was signed July 18, he stated he didn't 
sign the minutes the same day, (T. 346, 347). The 
witness admitted that the condition of the Sugarhouse 
property was going down and how it could be saved 
from foreclosure by somebody purchasing it had been 
discussed for months before the actual sale to the de-
fendant, William L. Hansen, ('T. 347, 348), and that 
the physical condition of the property was going down. 
Witness stated that he was collecting most of the rent 
most of the time and that "all tenants were anxious 
to have a longer lease and raise their rent." (T. 348, 
352). When asked if that's why they wanted to sell 
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the property because the rents were going up and ten-
ants were asking for increases and longer leases, the 
witness evaded an answer, (T. 352, 353), although he 
had just testified that the n1eetings between himself and 
his father and other members of the family were to try 
to salvage something out of the property if possible, 
(T. 349). Bill was not a director or a stockholder. 1-'lw 
witness had testified that he never knew about the sale 
of the property until after it was consum1nated, although 
he attended meetings prior to the sale at which the mat-
ter was discussed, and that Bill had offered $10,000.00 
for the property, (T. 344), and the board of directors 
had authorized his father to look into the advisability 
of selling the property, (T. 345), because something had 
to be salvaged from it. He then testified that the ten-
ants were urging that their rents be doubled and their 
leases lengthened, but refused to answer the question 
as to why when the property was going up and every-
thing was fine and lovely and tenants were asking that 
the rents be doubled, the directors wanted his father 
to check into the advisability of selling it. Upon being 
press·ed for an answer to this question, he then admitted 
that he knew or assumed that Bill was figuring on buy-
ing the property and had been talking to his father about 
it, (T. 353). On further cross examination the witness 
admitted that the upstairs is rented in apartments at 
$25.00 each, and that these are under 0. P. A., and 
the rents couldn't go up and were frozen and couldn't 
be increased, and that the tenants couldn't be put out, 
(T. 354, 355). Mr. Jensen, counsel for the plaintiffs, 
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objected that regardless of the 0. P. A. regulations you 
could put them out, but the court said: "You could 
down here. I never could get the Supren1e Court to 
tell me whether-". The court apparently changed his 
mind on finishing this sentence, but it is obvious that 
he was about to say that he could never get this court 
to tell him what was to be done, so he was granted the 
motion to strike out what was said about the 0. P. A., 
(T. 355 ). Although the witness had testified that he 
was there most of the time and collected most of the 
rents most of the time, on cross examination when 
asked if he discussed with the tenants about expanding 
on the lower floor and giving room upstairs, the witness 
said: ""I had nothing to do with that", (T. 355). 
The plaintiffs offered Werner Kiepe as an expert 
on real estate values. ~fr. Kiepe testified that he was a 
real estate broker engaged in the business of real es-
tate appraising since 1928, and generally gave his quali-
fication including the fact that he was the first man 
to qualify in the State of Utah for the American Insti-
tute of Real Estate Appraisers, (T. 218, 220); that he 
appraised the property and improvements at the south-
west corner of 21st South and Highland Drive in Sugar-
house with special reference to its market value in the 
month of July, 1945, and that he was familiar with real 
estate values in Sugarhouse, (T. 220); that he made as 
much of an inspection of the building as he could get 
into and also examined the data contained in the deposi-
tion of Mr. W. L. Hansen which are Exhibits 2, 3 and 4, 
the financial statements for 1943, 1944 and 1945. He 
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made only one inspection, and that was yesterday, (T. 
222). The witness was testifying on Monday, June 21, 
1948, so the day he made the inspection was Sunday, 
June 20, 1948, (T. 256). When all the stores were closed 
but one, and he wasn't able to get into any of the stores, 
and all he was able to get into in the building was the 
boiler room in the basement and upstairs, and in none 
of the stores downstairs. He made his appraisement 
from what he saw from the outside, (T. 256, 257). His 
appraisal was made on the assumption that the figures 
in Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 were true, (T. 222). He measured 
the exterior of the building and noted the construction. 
They are brick buildings with frame interiors, stone 
foundations with some concrete. He didn't have a chance 
to view the entire foundations. The buildings evidenced 
that they were of average construction, and he took 
Mr. Hansen's testimony that there was 293,000 cubic 
feet, or about 16,50U ~quare feet on the ground floor, 
and he doesn't remember the second floor. (T. 222, 223). 
From this examination made as above indicated three 
years after the sale he arrived at a market value of the 
building of July, 1945, at a repla0ement cost of $115,-
000.00, ( T. 228), the land being valued on the corner 
piece 48x85 at $500.00 a front foot, and the remainder 
$350.00 a front foot, making a total value of the land 
without improvements, of $80,000.00, then the cost of 
the buildings new at $117,200.00 with the depreciation 
factor of 70 per cent or $82,040.00, or a depreciated value 
of the buildings of $35,160.00 or a total value of $115,-
160.00 for land and buildings. (T. 226, 227). $115,000.00 is 
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the ultimate figure he \\·ants to giYe, ( T. :2:2~). rl,here has 
been nothing ~old in the in1mediate vicinity to his knowl-
e~lge that i~ ron1paratiYP and nothing in tl~at vieinit~· that 
woul<l give him a direct bearing, (T. 230). It was agreed 
that a part of the description included in the lis pendens 
from which the '"itness 1neasured the land was incorred 
because it didn ~t belong to the Granite Holding(_ 'ompany, 
and ~Ir. ,Y. L. Hansen had to quit-claim it back to the 
original owner, (T. 234). On cross examination the 
witness stated that the $500.00 a foot value covered all 
of the property on 21st South to its full depth and the 
balance on 11th East is the $350.00. These figures are 
based on his judgment, and his judgment comes from 
a valuation of the property in order to have it pay a 
return, and secondly on sales of vacant property; that 
there have been no sales in Sugarhouse for quite a long 
time, but this month there was a sale at lOth East and 
21st South at $400.00 a foot, but that that property is not 
comparable and that the values would be 20 per cent 
higher today than they were in 1945, but the property 
that sold for $400.00 a foot would probably be a little 
more than 20 per cent, (T. 236,237, 238). The witness ad-
mitted that in July, 1945, the market was depressed. We 
were still in a war economy. Some merchants were ex-
panding as fast as they could, others were having diffi-
culties in securing materials and merchandise. There 
were buyers anxious to make investments. There was 
apprehension about the extension of 0. P. A. to com-
mercial property and freezing of rents on business pro-
perty, (T. 238, 239). He doesn't know of any sales 
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in Sugarhouse or in that vicinity for $500.00 a foot even 
today. The sale of the property on the notheast corner 
of 21st South and Highland Drive (11th East) in 1936 
or 1937 was for $75,000.00. He understood that the 
Southeast Furniture Company bought their property 
from the Granite Holding Company. He hasn't looked 
at it from the point of view of an appraisal. He doesn't 
know that it was sold for $65,000.00 in 1939. He knows 
where the Granite Mart is, and it is on 21st South right 
adjoining this particular property. He thinks there is 
about 77 feet there. He doesn't know how deep it is and 
doesn't know that in 1941 that property sold for $43,-
000.00. It is a two story building and is about the same 
age as the south building on the subject property built 
probably before 1920. He only knows the condition of 
the property in question here in 1945 in a general way. 
He took into consideration the figures of income and 
expenses for the thr·ee years, 1943, 1944 and 1945 and 
took into consideration that those were the actual figures 
without anything for depreciation, and he didn't find 
that the property operated at a loss, ( T. 243). A pur-
chaser if he didn't have $115,000.00 would be quite in-
te·rested in the mortgage, and that would enter into his 
idea of values regardless of theoretical figures of $500.00 
a foot and $350.00 a foot. He would want to know 
whether the property would pay for itself, and if the 
property wasn't paying for itself and wasn't paying 
the interest and wasn't paying the mortgage, it would 
be worth a good deal less than $115,000.00, ( T. 244). 
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The \Yitnes8 on further cross exmnination admitted 
that when he had stated that the Granite :Mart with 
77 feet at a purchase price of $43,000.00 was $600.00 a 
foot. that the $600.00 a foot was not the value of the 
land; that it included the building, so that without the 
building on it it would be about 0 of the $600.00 a foot 
value, (T. 245). The witness further admitted that the 
property in question when he inspected it yesterday 
showed that there had been improvements made of re-
cent origin, and that it would be improper to include 
them in arriving at a reproduction cost as he had done; 
that he has no way of knowing "\Yhat has be~n spent 
on this property on improvements since 1945 and that 
his replacement figures are replacement of the building 
as he saw it yesterday, (T. 247). He thought the salary 
paid ~[r. X ephi J. Hansen as shown by Exhibits 2, 3 
and 4. was fair, (T. ~49), and he also thought that his 
judgment as to replacement cost would he changed by 
a better knowledge of improvements which had been 
made between 1945 and now, and that replacement costs 
are higher today than they were in 1945, and that im-
provements done since 1945 would cost more than they 
did in 1945, (T. 250). He tried to depreciate the pro-
perty by replacement costs in 1945 without knowing what 
the new improvements were since that time, (T. 252), 
and the witness finally admitted that if the corporation 
had operated the property so that for the three pre-
ceding years it did not produce revenue sufficient to 
pay for itself that it would be worthless because "some-
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thing that doesn't produce any profit is worthless", 
(T. 253). 
On behalf of plaintiff Eugene P. Watkins testified 
that he was the secretary of the Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company, the mortgagee of the property in question; 
that on December 1, 1945, the mortgage was $75,000.00; 
July 18, 1945, it was $74,500.00; September 8, 1945, 
$73,938.30; that the mortgage in 1941 was $82,528.13; 
that in the year 1945 up to July only $500.00 had been 
paid on the mortgage, ( T. 265, 266) ; that under the 
mortgage after January 1, 1943, until October 1, 1951, 
there was due under the mortgage $500.00 per month 
plus accrued interest, and then all of the unpaid balance 
and interest were due, (T. 267, 268). For 1945 up to 
July there had been paid on taxes a total of $1961.76 
made in several payments, and interest was paid August 
1, 1945, (T. 268); that the Beneficial Life in November, 
1945, paid taxes in the amount of $2770.38. The mort-
gage provides that the mortgagor must make a deposit 
each month during the life of the mortgage for the pay-
ment of taxes. Their custom was to appropriate the 
money first for the interest, then for the taxes, (T. 270). 
The total amount of taxes paid in 1945 was paid from 
deposits made by the mortgagor, ( T. 271). On Decem-
ber 1, 1944, the mortgage was considerably delinquent 
and even more delinquent in July of 1945, and the mort-
gagee had not waived payment of the $500.00 monthly 
payment on the principal, (T. 271). The renewal mort-
gage in 1941 of $82,000.00 was a renewal of a previous 
renewal of $127,500.00 which in turn was a renewal of a 
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previous mortgage of $200,000.00, and that mortgage was 
in turn a renewal of the previous Inortgage of $150,-
000.00. The original mortgage was made April 22, 1926, 
to the Granite Lumber Company for $150,000.00, then 
increased in 1~):27 to $200,00.00, and in December, 1939, 
renewed for $127,500.00. The principal payments on the 
mortgage were n1ade by conveyance of the properties 
and the purchase price applied on the mortgage, (T. 
271. 273). The balance due on the mortgage on June 1, 
1948, was $61,500.00, (T. 273). 
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case defendant, 
'Villiam L. Hansen, made a motion for a non-suit upon 
the ground that plaintiffs' evidence showed that William 
L. Hansen paid a valuable consideration for the pro-
perty; that the board of directors formally passed a 
resolution authorizing the sale; that the sale was made 
in compliance with the resolution; that the corporation 
took his money and still has it; that there is no evidence 
of fraud. William L. Hansen wasn't a director or stock-
holder, and that he dealt with the company in the same 
manner as the public had dealt with it for at least 25 
years; that in 1939 the board of directors authorized 
the president and secretary to sell all of the properties 
as became necessary in their judgment and as the secre-
tary and president had done on numerous occasions; 
that none of the plaintiffs and no stockholder at any 
time had complained of the manner in which the busi-
ness of the company was transacted or made any com-
plaints of any kind; that there was no collusive agree-
ment, no unfair advantage taken of the corporation; 
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that the evidence shows that the property was not even 
meeting expenses, was deteriorating, the company was 
delinquent on the mortgage, and that it had lost all of 
its other properties merely for the amount of the mort-
gage, whereas, this sale was the only sale ever made 
where any money was actually received by the company 
over and above the amount of the mortgage. What be-
came of the money after it was paid to the company 
was no concern of this defendant, and he had no right 
to exercise any control over its disposition; that this 
defendant had no knowledge of any defects, if any there 
were, in the resolution or the minutes, and that the Gran-
ite Holding Company and the stockholders are bound as 
against this defendant, whether the directors were de 
facto or de jure. There was nothing unusual in this 
transaction except that the company got more out of 
it than it had in other sales; that Nephi Hansen accord-
ing to the plaintiffs had always operated the company 
as his own without objection from them. The court de-
nied the motion for non-suit. Motion for non-suit was 
also made on behalf of Granite Holding Company and 
denied. 
DEFENDANTS' WITNESSES 
On the question of the value of the premises at 
the time of the purchase the defendant, William L. Han-
sen, offered two witnesses-Richard F. Harding and S. 
R. Nielson, ( T. 364, 384). 
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~fr. Harding is executive vice-president of the Salt 
Lake Real Estate Board and former manager for ele,Ten 
years for the real estate department of First Security 
Trust Company; also secretary of the Real Estate 
Board's .Appraisal Connnittee, experienced throughout 
these years in the appraising and managing of all types 
of property, a civil engineer and associated with a:ll 
phases of real estate, (T. 364, 365). In 1945, particularly 
in June and July, he was personally familiar with the 
property under consideration, had been on the property, 
knew its physical condition, had considered a statement 
that had been submitted to him with reference to the in-
come and expenses, and he had at that time made an ex-
amination of this property for the specific purpose of 
determining its valuation. He does not recall at whose 
request but does know that he wrote a letter to Nephi 
Hansen with respect to the valuation, and that he took 
into consideration the income, the rents, the age of 
the building, the location, the physical condition of the 
property; that he had a general knowledge of property 
values in that vicinity, together with the real estate 
board's official publication fixing front foot value of 
land throughout the entire city regardless of whether or 
not there is a building on such land, and that valuation 
is still in use and was in use in June and July of 1945, 
(T. 367, 368). Land values in Sugar house have changed 
very little since 1936 because the traffic is not properly 
channeled through the streets there. There is no park-
ing available, particularly along the south side of 21st 
South and along Highland Drive. This is forcibly 
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brought out by 0. P. Skaggs moving out of the district. 
As a result of his experience and personal examination 
at the time, he came to two conclusions-that in view 
of the fact that the owner of the property had been un-
able to show any net return, that the property from a 
financial basis was not worth more than the mortgage. In 
fact, they were not making principal payments on the 
mortgage. He also secured a current cost of reproduc-
tion after breaking the property into four parcels, each 
with a different age, and depreciated them to the cur-
rent life from the estimated ages furnished and reached 
a conclusion of $90,000.00 as a total value of the pro-
perty. He qualified this value by the condition that it 
was worth that much only if the postwar retail market 
was as anticipated by the optimistic economists. Under 
the management of the Granite Holding Company the 
property was not worth more than the mortgage itself, 
(T. 368, 369). The roof was in bad shape, fire walls 
showed considerable disintegration, the store fronts 
were obsolete, the apartments were in bad condition and 
frozen at an uneconomic rental. In fact, the property 
would have been better off without the operation of the 
apartments. In his judgment it would have ·cost at that 
time upwards of $50,000.00 to do anything to put the 
property in competition with property across the street. 
Exhibit 6 was offered which is Mr. Harding's letter to 
Mr. Nephi Hansen, was objected to and objection sus-
tained. Exhibit 6 establishes the date and the circum-
stances and should have been received in evidence. It 
is here before this court for examination and shows that 
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Mr. Harding's report to _Mr. Hansen was 1nade ,June 12 
and made no allowance for depreciation. This should 
have been receiYed in evidence as it shows that there 
was a basis both on the part of the defendant, Granite 
Holding Con1pany, and the defendant, "'\Villian1 L. Han-
sen, for the purchase price paid for this property, ( T. 
369, 372). 
On cross examination Mr. Harding stated that a.t 
the time he examined the property his recollection is 
that the occupancy was complete. He knew from his 
experience in property management for many years 
that the state1nent furnished him as to expenses of 
operating the property would be approximately correct. 
He definitely charged to the expense of operation inter-
est on the indebtedness against the property. If you 
don't make the interest payments, you don't have any 
property, (T. 372). He recalls that the mortgage was 
approximately $72,000.00 to $7 4,000.00. The Salt Lake 
Real Estate Board is made up of real ,estate agents and 
people engaged in the real estate business in Salt Lake 
City and also has a division of apartment house owners, 
and the witness is also executive vice-president of this 
division. The fee for managing property is in some in-
stances higher than 5 per cent and in some instances as 
low as 3 per cent of the gross income of the property. 
He was not interested in what Mr. Hansen thought of 
the property. He reached his own conclusion. Mr. Han-
sen did not ask him to depress his appraisal, and you 
can't say generally that there was or was not an in-
crease in real estate values in 1945 or 1942 or 1943 with-
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out analyzing the specific property in question. You 
can't make a generalization about it, (T. 380, 381). 
Mr. Nielson testified that he is the executive vice-
president of the First Security Bank of Utah in charge 
of the Real Estate Department and the mortgage loan 
appraisals, and that he has been appraising property 
for mortgages with that company and its predecessor 
since 1921. He has been salesman, salesmanager, assist-
ant in the mortgage department, assistant vice-president, 
preceding his present position as executive vice-presi-
dent. His business is appraising business and residential 
property for mortgage purposes and occasionally for 
sales purposes. He was familiar with the property 
under consideration in Sugarhous,e in June and July of 
1945. He had been in several of the buildings· at various 
times and had inspected it for the bank and appraised 
it. In June and July of 1945 he went all through the 
property, familiarized himself with the income and ex-
penses. He was familiar with the values in Sugarhouse. 
His own company has a branch there. He is familiar 
with values in 'Sugarhouse, (T. 384, 387). After his 
examination for the hank, he quickly decided it wasn't 
a property upon which the bank would loan money, and 
he told Mr. Nephi Hansen that the bank would not en-
tertain a loan. He came to the conclusion that if the 
buildings were managed more efficiently and some 
money was available to make som,e repairs and improve-
ments that were necessary, the property might be worth 
$90,000.00, but it was necessary to make improvements 
in many places in order for it to be worth that amount, 
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(T. 387). The roof was in bad condition, and you could 
see evidences of leakage in the apartments upstairs and 
in the stores downstairs. The fire walls and cornices were 
deteriorated to a point where it was dangerous. The 
store fronts were not n1odern, (T. 388). On cross ex-
amination he reiterated that he made his examination 
for the purpose of appraising the building to see whether 
it was desirable for the bank to make a loan on it, and 
the bank as a result declined to make the loan, {T. 390). 
He thought the property was worth $90,000.00 only 
if some money was spent on it and good management 
was secured for it. He was qualified to express an opin-
ion on the value. $90,000.00 was not the fair market 
value of the property. It would only be the market 
value if those things were done. He measured the build-
ings, and from a cubicle measurement you can get quite 
an inflated idea of value if you want to. You can build 
it up or knock it down, and he was influenced in declining 
the loan to some extent by the way the property was 
managed and operated and all the rest of the factors 
that he has stated, (T. 392). Nephi J. Hansen is the one 
who asked him to come out and look at the property for 
the purpose of getting a loan on it. On redirect, he 
again stated that his value of $90,000.00 was not based 
upon the management the property then had, but upon 
future good management, plus the needed repairs. He 
has an opinion as to front footage value on that pro-
perty, and using Mr. Kiepe's map, instead of $500.00 
a foot, he valued the property at $350.00 a foot, probably 
nearer $300.00, and the balance of it at $225.00 a foot, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
60 
which would be a total of either $50,000.00 or $55,000.00 
for the real estate, depending upon whether you use 
$350.00 a foot or $300.00. This was its value for either 
loan or sale purpoHes, ( T. 394). He and his company 
are pretty fair about values. He understands market 
value to be what a willing purchaser is willing to pay 
a willing seller, (T. 395). 
The defendant, W. L. Hansen, testified that he be-
came interested in the property in May of 1945, because 
he had raised some money to buy a hotel in Oregon, and 
the deal fell through. He had about $20,000.00 and was 
looking for a place to put it. He was asked if he would 
consider working out some kind of a program on the 
Sugarhouse property which was very much run down. 
His mother was the first one who asked him if he 
couldn't do something about it, and later he was asked 
by his father. His father and mother asked him. He did 
not ask them, (T. 397, 398). 
He was not in Sugarhouse for a good many years. 
From 1936 until 1942 he operated his hotel in Ashton, 
Idaho. In 1942 he leased his hotel and was trying to get 
a dehydration plant started in Idaho. Then he spent some 
time on his wife's folks' farm in Farmington. He was 
not in Sugarhouse but a very few times before the 
actual deal for this property was made. He had noth-
ing to do with the management of the property and 
nothing whatever to do with his father's business at all. 
He had not been close to his father. They had had dif-
ferences on other property, and they were just not very 
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close. He had no business connection with him whatso-
ever, (T. 399, 400). 'Vhen his mother and then his 
father asked him to make an investigation of the pro-
perty, he went down and looked it over to see what could 
be done. He understood his father was the principal 
stockholder and didn't even 1."1low there was any pre-
ferred stock or anything about the operation of the 
business, (T. 400). The physical condition of the pro-
perty was very bad. One building was built about 1900. 
There was a lot of lead pipe fLxtures for drainage that 
were breaking very often. The apartments upstairs were 
not kept up. There was a low 0. P. A. rent fixed on 
them. On the ground floor there was one place not 
occupied. The rents were all low. There were no base-
ments under about half of it, and some of the bricks on 
the base of the corner property which was built about 
1900 had begun to decompose next to the stone founda-
tions, which created a very hazardous condition. He 
examined the income, and the sheets, Exhibits 2, 3 and 
4, in evidence were compiled from that examination. He 
consulted with persons who had knowledge of values in 
Sugarhouse, to-wit, Governor Mabey, George Cannon, 
Vice-President of the Beneficial Life Insurance Com-
pany, Junius Romney, who is administrator for Barnard 
Stewart's estate. He knew the values that Harding and 
Nielson had fixed on the property, and he made all these 
investigations and examinations before he made any 
offer. He made the company his offer for the property, 
and they had it under consideration for approximately 
six weeks. He never had any meeting with the board 
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of directors or attended any directors' meetings. He 
said nothing to any of the directors with reference to 
his purchase except to his father, and all he did to him 
was to submit the offer to accept or reject as the board 
saw fit. The board accepted it, and he paid his money 
and got his deed. His father showed him a letter from 
the Beneficial Life showing what the sales were for the 
various other pieces of property and how they had been 
applied on the mortgage. He had this in mind he re-
calls at the time of the purchase, (T. 400, 404). He lmew 
what the sale price of the property to the Southeast 
Furniture was, and the Southeast Furniture property 
was $65,000.00. Those buildings were comparatively new, 
built of fire brick, had good cement and steel reinforce-
ments for foundations, and had much more square foot-
age than the property he bought, and at least twice or 
maybe three times more ground than the property he 
bought. He made a calculation at that time as to what 
it would cost to make needed repairs, and that was 
$10,000.00, ( T. 405). Governo·r Mabey is in California. 
He had tried to get him here for this hearing. Plain-
tiff's counsel objected to witness testifying whether Gov-
ernor Mabey advised him to buy or not. The witness 
conferred with Governor Mabey who had been in busi-
ness in Sugarhouse for many years in real estate loans 
and building finance company, ('T. 405, 406). He had 
not had an)~ 1neetings with the fan1ily with reference to 
purchasing the property until one meeting imn1ediately 
prior to the day before the deed was granted, (T. 406). 
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He talked to his brother, L. F. Hansen, about the 
propert~· and the condition it wn~ in in the earl~· spring of 
19-!:J and suggested that L. F. Hansen go down and help 
their father and see if there wasn't a possible chance of 
saving anything out of the property. Later L. F. Hansen 
reported there wasn't any value there. It wasn't worth 
the mortgage, and L. F. Hansen refused to have anything 
to do with it, (T. 407, 408). The witness made no efforts 
whatsoever to influence the directors of the company one 
way or another. Since he bought the property he has 
put in it of his own money a minimum of $14,000.00, ( T. 
408). 
His father has operated the Granite Holding Com-
pany as long as he can remember. He never remembers 
anyone else having anything to do with it or the sale of 
its property. In his deal with the Granite Holding Com-
pany the company was represented by Attorney Ed. 
Clyde. He didn't talk to merchants in Sugar house as 
to what they thought the property was ~~easonably 
worth, but he talked to people who were familiar with 
business conditions there, (T. 410). He does not know 
whether any offer had been made through any real 
estate companies placing this property up for public 
sale. As far as he was concerned his father was the 
entire company subject to the approval of the board of 
directors. 
On behalf of defendant, N·ephi Hansen, Clyde F. 
Hansen was recalled and testified that he is the oldest 
member of the Hansen family; that he was a stockholder 
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in the Granite Lumber Company and the Granite Hold-
ing Company; that he has about $4,500.00 in the com-
pany and is very interested in it, has been secretary 
since 1929 until the first of this year, (until the first 
of 1948), (T. 414). During the winter and early spring 
of 1944 and 1945 he discussed with his father the situa-
tion so far as this property was concerned. It was when 
there was snow on the ground. His father called at his 
home in his car and took him up to Ft. Douglas, and 
they parked there and talked for an hour or more, 
(T. 415). Objection was made to relating the conversa-
tion and in the course of the discussion the court said to 
counsel for plaintiffs: 
''I suppose you have got to show some kind 
of collusion in here between this corporation, the 
alter ego of Mr. Hansen, and William L. Hansen 
in the purchase of the matter. * * * I think I 
ought to hear it. The objection will be over-
ruled." (T. 416). 
The witness continued to relate the conversation. 
The property was getting in such bad shape, and they 
had to have money to build it up and to build up the 
rental or there was no use fighting for it any more. His 
father as president of the company had made efforts to 
borrow money from the R. F. C. The witness was with 
him. His father made a trip to San Francisco in 1944, 
and it was impossible for him to get a loan any pla:ce. 
At the time of this conversation neither the defendant, 
William L. Hansen, nor anybody else to his knowledge 
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had made any oYertnre~ or had come into the picture 
to giYe new Inoney to the company, (T. 418). 
During the last ten or twelve years, and particularly 
in 19-l-! and U1-13 relations were strained between W. L. 
Hansen and his father. They had had difficulties and 
misunderstandings, and there were strained feelings dur-
ing that time until just before this sale in S'ugarhouse 
was made, ( T. 418, 419). The witness testified that Lewis 
Hansen (L. F. Hansen) was the one who got his father 
and mother together with Bill in the first instance on 
this deal. Upon objection the court struck this evidence, 
and we submit that the evidence was competent. (Lewis 
Hansen was a dir·ector of the defendant corporation and 
had already testified on direct examination tiiat he knew 
nothing about the deal). Bill was present at none of the 
directors' meetings. When the witness's father talked 
to him about the company being in difficulty and need-
ing new money, he, the witness, contacted several people 
to find out the value of these premises. He also talked 
to several people after Bill made his proposition of 
purchase. L. F. Hansen nffirer made any objection or 
opposition to this deal with Bill, and all the directors 
were satisfied with Bill's proposition, (T. 420, 421). 
There was no trouble over the deal until Lew, (L. F. 
Hansen), had disagreement with Bill. They were in the 
real estate business together, and there was some trouble 
developed there. Lew left the company and immediately 
started this action. Until that time he had not raised 
his voice against the transaction. At no directors' meet-
ing did L. F. Hansen ever mention anything about stock-
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holders, (T. 421, 422). The witness took the resolution, 
Exhibit "D", signed by all directors, into Mr. Jones, 
attorney for W. L. Hansen. The witness gave the min-
utes to Mr. Jones. Witness discussed the Sugarhouse 
transaction on several occasions with L. F. Hansen, and 
it was the subject of conversation for som·e time prior 
to the time the deed was signed, was discussed at a 
meeting on July 11, and the deed was not signed until 
after the board of directors took formal action. The 
minutes show the deed to be executed on the 16th and 
the meeting of the board on the 18th of July. This is 
a mistake in date. The witness doesn't know how the 
mistake came about, but he is sure that the deed was 
not made out until the day following the meeting. At 
the time he took the minutes to Mr. Jones they were 
signed by all of the board of directors. It already ap-
pears from prior witnesses that the first check of 
$5,000.00 was not delivered to the company until the 
minutes were brought to Mr. Jones, (T. 424). The first 
check is dated July 27, 1945, and was cashed July 28, 
1945, Exhibit "G", and the deed was recorded July 28, 
1945, which is the same day that it was delivered to 
W. L. Hansen. 
No attempt was made to list the property with a 
real estate man or offer it to the public. Witness talked 
to others about it though, and when his father told him 
the property was run down and couldn't be sold and the 
company was about to lose it, he believed what his 
father said, (T. 425). Witness never talked to any 
lawyer about bringing this action. He had nothing to 
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do with being put in as a party plaintiff. Lew did that. 
\Yitness can't explain the discrepancy in dates between 
the deed and the minutes, but it is very evident that all 
it is is a mistake in date, ( T. -!26). \Yitness understood 
that $5,000.00 of the $10,000.00 purchase money was to 
go to his father, (T. -!27). The second payn1ent check 
for $3800.00 is endorsed in his father's handwriting. 
The Hansen Holding Company is a company that was 
organized to operate some real estate up on Genter 
Street, (T. 427). Granite Holding Company had a bank 
account in Sugar house. He doesn't know why the second 
pa)lllent check was put in the Hansen Holding Com-
pany. His father made all the checks and deposits, 
(T. 429). As a director, witness's first interest was 
always for the company. The money received from Bill 
for the purchase of the property was the first real 
money the Granite Holding Company had ~eceived in 
fifteen years, except from rents. The sale to Bill was 
for the sale of all the remaining assets of the Granite 
Holding Company. After the witness heard of the offer 
from Bill, he consulted with Sid Mullcock, Newell Day-
ton of Tracy Loan & Trust Company, Governor Mabey, 
and Junius Romney about the value of this property, 
and it was after those conversations that the deed was 
executed, ( T. 430, 431). 
On re-cross examination witness stated that he was 
present at a meeting of the stockholders at which Lew 
and Keith Bates were present. At that m,eeting he did 
not say that he and Lew had started the lawsuit and 
that now he realized they were entirely wrong, nor did 
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he say that the stockholders had been cheated. What he 
actually said was that there was nothing in the property; 
that he had as much interest in it as anybody, (T. 432). 
The defendants served notice that they desired 
further to cross examine Lewis F. Hansen. Counsel 
for the plaintiffs objected, and the court sustained the 
objection, stating that defendants could reopen by using 
Lewis F. Hansen as their witness. Defendants then made 
a tender of cross examination to ask Lewis F. Hansen 
the names of the tenants who were anxious to have 
their r~ent raised at the time this property was sold to 
Bill, Lewis F. Hansen having testified ''I was there more 
than anybody else, and all the tenants were anxious 
to have longer leases and raise their r·ents ", and that 
the rents be doubled, (T. 348, 352), (pages 209, 213 of 
the reporter's transcript), and we further offered to 
show that Lewis F. Hansen couldn't giv.e the name of 
one tenant who had made such a request. The court re-
fused to permit this procedure, but did permit re-
opening for the purpose of questioning G. M. South-
wick who testified that he is the husband of Mary Hansen 
Southwick and a son-in-law of Nephi J. Hansen; that he 
was at a meeting at the home of Nephi Hansen in June 
of 1945 when the sale of the property in Sugarhouse to 
Bill was discussed; that at that meeting there were pres-
ent besides himself N.J. Hansen and wife, the daughters, 
LaRue Nebeker and Mary Southwick, his wife, Clyde 
Hansen, Lewis and Bill. At that meeting which is the 
only meeting he attended Lewis Hansen did not say, 
"I think we ought to do something about the stock-
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holders before we do anything like this", nor did Bill 
blow up and cause a scene. Nothing of the kind oc-
curred. He was not on the board of directors and didn't 
have any stock in the company, (T. 443, 446). 
Clyde F. Hansen testified that he knew Joseph E. 
Jensen, one of the directors who signed the resolution, 
Exhibit "D ". and that he is the father of W. V. Jensen, 
referred to throughout the testimony as Vivian Jensen, 
and the husband of :Mrs. J. E. Jensen, both plaintiffs 
in this case, and that those two plaintiffs have no stock 
in the Granite Holding Company, (T. 494). 
Keith Bates was re-called by the plaintiffs and 
was asked if at a meeting of the stockholders shortly 
after this lawsuit had been filed at which Clyde and Lew 
Hansen were present, Clyde Hansen stated in substance 
and effect that he had been instrumental or had started 
this lawsuit, and that he now realized that he was 
wrong, or anything like that. Although counsel for the 
plaintiff called Mr. Bates as his witness, and asked him 
this question, he refused to let Mr. Bates answer it 
as he desired. The following appears: 
"Q. Did he make that statement1 
''A. Yes. May I make one qualification~ 
"Q. Well, did he make the statement I asked~ 
''A. Yes, in· effect.'' 
There is no way to determine what the witness desired 
to testify to, and there is thus no other evidence in the 
record to dispute Clyde Hansen's testimony. 
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At the conclusion of W. L. Hansen's testinwny, (T. 
408, 409), his counsel was prepared and about to pro-
ceed with an account of the expenditures Mr. Hansen 
had made and the work he had done on this property. 
Thereupon counsel for plaintiff remarked that if there 
was going to he an accounting, then such testimony 
should be part of the accounting. There was some (L:-
cussion with the court, which is not reported in the rec-
ord, merely the word "discussion," (T. 409), at which 
it was decided in the interest of time to omit this te3ti-
mony of work and labor and money spent until it was 
determined whether or not an accounting would be 
heard. But immediately after the conclusion of the de-
fendant's testimony, the court held that the reasonable 
and fair market value at the time of the sale was 
$100,000.00; that the $14,000.00 Bill Hansen had prut 
into the property should be deducted from Mr. Kiepe's 
appraisement of $11'5,000.00, and that the testimony of 
Harding and Nielson tpat the value was $90,000.00 de-
preciated the property "a little". As to the defend-
ant's ,evidence as to the fair value ascertained at the 
. time of the sale, the court said: 
''One was by the man who puts mortgages 
on and who wants to make sure there is security, 
and I have forgotten who gave the other figure.'' 
(T. 436). 
The other figure was given by Mr. Harding, the most 
competent and qualified witness of all of them and the 
man who since has been called by the national organiza-
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tion to occupy an exerntiYe position in the National Real 
Estate Organization. In that frame of rnind the court 
held that the deed should be set aside. 
"I find that there "Tas a colln~ive arrange-
ment behYeen 'Y"illian1 Hansen and his father, 
Nephi J. Hansen, with the intent to defraud these 
preferred stockholders of any equity that rnight 
be there, and I find that there was some $15,-
000.00 equity involved at the time of the trans-
fer. Therefore, I order that the deed be set aside 
and the property restored to the corporation. 
·'X ow, the n1atter of accounting, I suppose 
we have got to set that down. Willian1 L. Han-
sen will have some accounting against this cor-
poration." (T. 437, 438). 
This quotation from the court is given here because 
later in argument we shall discuss the utter lack of basis 
for the decision of the court. The last statement of the 
court is interesting, that William L. Hansen will have 
an accounting against the corporation, in view of what 
the court actually did in giving the corporation a judg-
ment of substantially $30,000.00 against William L. Han-
sen. At this time and in view of the fact that the court 
said that there was a $15,000.00 equity between what was 
paid and the value of the property, and that during the 
period Bill Hansen had the property there was a $30,-
000.00 net profit, it will be interesting for plaintiffs' 
counsel to explain how income taxes would have been 
paid on this $30,000.00 from this property as it was 
operated by the corporation and at the same time save 
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the $15,000.00 equity. There was no such profit, and 
there was no such equity. Both the state and the gov-
ernment permitted the complete depreciation of the 
corner building during this period. 
(B) The Alleged Accoum.tilng 
Some of the testimony given on this feature of the 
case is also applicable to the merits of the main case 
and was before the court before any findings, conC'ln-
sions or judgment was entered herein. Four of the 
persons who were tenants of the Granite Holding Com-
pany and who remained tenants after the property was 
sold testified substantially the same. Walter 0. Peter-
son occupies the property farthest south on 11th East, 
(T. 447). Adelbert W. Hart is just north of Mr. Peter-
son's location, (T. 456). L. J. Batchelor has the next 
location north, and he operates a barber shop, (T. 479). 
Then north of him is Melvin L. Brain who operates 
Bud's Mens' Duds, (T. 471). Each witness stated that 
at the time W. L. Hansen took over the property August 
1, 1945, he was paying all the rent that the property was 
worth; that none of them ever asked Nephi Hansen to 
raise their rent. They were unwilling to have their rent 
raised; that the property was in bad condition from the 
leaking roof. The plumbing would leak through and 
destroy merchandise, and that Nephi Hansen never did 
anything to fix up the property, (T. 448, 449, 459, 463, 
471, 472, 474, 481). Each witness also testified that after 
W. L. Hansen took over the property he made extensive 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
73 
, hnprove~uents, gaYe the tenants n1ore space, fixed upr 
the property ~o that the leaks were corrected, and for 
the new space and repairs and new leases charged them 
additional rents. He also agreed in consideration of 
the higher rents to put in new fronts and do other re-
modeling and renovating which he had not yet done, 
and that they "·ere unwilling to pay the new rents unless 
the additional work was completed, and that since Bill 
took over they have had no dealings with anybody ex-
cept 'Y. L. Hansen. They have had no dealings whatever 
since that time with Nephi J. Hansen, (T. 448). It was 
agreed that the new leases contain provisions for re-
modeling the store fronts "to be done as soon as deemed 
, . 
.... 
, advisable'', ''to remodel the front of said property in 
a high class 1nanner", (T. 619, 620). 
Defendant offered to show (T. 621) that the work 
of remodeling and renovating commenced in 1945 and 
was to be done over a period of three years, ( T. 624) ; 
that the twenty-six apartments upstairs rented for a 
total of $490.00 a month when he took over the pro-
perty; that the rent of the first store to the south was 
$150.00, and under his managem·ent the rent was in-
creased to $300.00 on condition that the remodeling was 
done, and that since the court had announced that the 
property was to be returned to Granite Holding Com-
pany, the tenant has insisted on the rent being adjusted 
to $225.00 a month, and that these premises include in 
addition to what they had at the time Mr. Hansen took 
over three of the upstairs apartments; that part of the 
Hart l\{usic Company, (Adelbert W. Hart), was occu-
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pied by Lincoln Hansen as a beer parlor paying $75.00 
a 1nonth; that defendant terminated his occupancy and 
Harts' were given additional space with a basement with 
promises of remodeling, which has not been done, at a 
rental of $375.00 a month which has now been reduced 
since the court's announcements to $250.00; that the 
barber shop occupies space formerly occupied by South-
east Camera Company and additional space, and the 
rent was fixed at $125.00 which has now been reduced 
to $100.00; that Brain, (Bud's Mens' Duds), was pay-
ing $125.00 when defendant took over. This was raised 
to $175.00 and has now been reduced to $125.00. Where 
the Ideal Furniture now is was a restaurant which went 
bankrupt. The restaurant was paying $300.00. Ideal 
Furniture moved and were given seven apartments up-
stairs with provision for improvements. Their rent was 
raised to $575.00, and their rent has now been reduced 
to $550.00. The cleaning company occupies the next 
space and are paying the same rent. The dress shop of 
Mrs. Stucki was paying $125.00. She was given addi-
tional space formerly occupied by Seagull Drug Com-
pany. The rent was raised to $310.00 and is now $250:00, 
and she is doing her own remodeling. Pehrson Hard-
war·e Company occupies the space formerly occupied 
by the barber shop and another barber shop on 21st 
South, Kemp's Child Clothing Company and Dr. Lan-
masser, in addition to their own space, all of which 
space was paying $560.00. Their rent was raised to 
$650.00, then Pehrson was given 2 apartments upstairs 
and additional space and his rent was raised to $750.00, 
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very bad condition. His basen1ent was full of refuse 
which he had to clean out. He had about one-third of 
the space he now has, and has a written agreement with 
the defendant to remodel the front of the building and 
completely renovate it, probably build a new building; 
(defendant paid him $500.00 approxin1ately towards the 
re1nodeling,) ( T. 488, 489). The Seagull Drug Store oc-
cupies three of the apartments at $70.00 a month for 
their office which was formerly on the ground floor. 
Three of the apartments are still rented to tenants 
and one of them is occupied by the janitor; that the im-
provements contemplated by the leases and which were 
not done were submitted to Ashton & Evans, archi-
tects, and to Garff Brothers and to the Nielson Con-
struction Company, and that they submitted estimates 
for the contemplated repairs to the front and the repair 
of the roof, and at that time when they were to com-
mence in 1945 and to be finished in three years the cost 
was estimated at $90,000.00 and would now cost $115,-
000.00. 
A statement had been prepared showing all the work 
that had been done by the defendant, and the court 
stated that instead of reading that why didn't we 
offer it in evidence. It was marked Exhibit 9, was offer-
ed, objected to, and the objection sustained, (T. 624, 
629). This was offered to support the expenditures 
which have been described and the work and labor 
perfonned by the defendant on this property. The ex-
hibit is too long to quote but shows extensive remodel-
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ing and renovating, redecorating and repairing and 
major improvements done by the defendant personally 
and under his personal supervision and direction and 
responsibility for which the court refused him any allow-
ance for his own work and labor or superintendence and 
only partial allowance for actual expenditures. We 
offered to show by S. R. Nielson who had already testi-
fied that he is executiv.e Vice-President of First Security 
Trust Company, that for the work Mr. Hansen did in 
managing this property, increasing the rentals and 
working along with the people, the reasonable value of 
his services would be $400.00 a month, and that Sid 
Mulcock, a constructor of a great many apartments and 
buildings, appraiser for Prudential Savings and 
Equitable Life, would testify to the same thing, and 
the court sustained the objection to this evidence and 
refused to allow anything to Mr. Hansen, (T. 629, 630). 
The parties had agreed that Mr. Goddard (of God-
dard-Abbey Company) and Mr. Wood (of Beesley-Wood 
& Company), certified public accountants, examine the 
operations of this property so far as they were ascer-
tainable from August 1, 1945, to June 30, 1948, (T. 497, 
498), and Exhibit 7 was ultimately worked out as a 
resume of the items of expenditure and the character 
of them and the status of them as they are at the pres-
ent time, and receiv<ed in evidence as illustrative of the 
testimony, (T. 603). 
Most of volume two of the testimony is taken up 
with details of the expenditures, and Exhibit 7 shows 
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that :\[r. 'Vood and :\lr. Goddard had agreed on items 
of expenditures of $69,093.84, but included in those itmns 
were other items which it was contended by the plaintiffs 
were not allowable, totaling $11,156.81. From some 
green pencil figuring on the exhibit apparently $6,450.00 
of these questioned sums were not allowed because they 
are deducted from the $69,093.84 iten1, leaving total ex-
penditures of $62,643.84. The eliminated items appar-
ently are salary paid by the defendant to Nephi J. 
Hansen of $5,950.00, for which he worked about 40 
hours each week, (T. 518, 519), and contribution by the 
defendant to the Sugarhouse Chamber of Commerce for 
the Cenntennial program of $500.00, both of which should 
have been allowed, as we shall hereafter point out. As 
heretofore noted from Exhibits 2, 3 and 4, Nephi J. 
Hansen in 1943, 1944 and 1945 was paid by the company 
$5,404.12 in 28 months. Under W. L. Hansen's owner-
ship in 35 months he was paid only $5,950.00. Yet the 
court held the sale was for the benefit of Nephi J. Han-
sen and refused to allow W. L. Hansen any credit. Nephi 
got less than when he managed the property, and Bill 
was allowed nothing. The defendant testified that the 
Sugarhouse Chamber of Commerce assessed all the mer-
chants in Sugarhouse for the Centennial program, and 
that the $500.00 was the amount assessed to this pro-
perty. It would have been assessed no matter who the 
owner was and was a legitimate item of expense. Page 
2 of Exhibit 7 is a schedule of expenditures actually 
made, as agreed upon by the auditors, but contested 
by the plaintiffs, though they were actually made on the 
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property. Some of them are cash payments for which 
receipts were available, and the remainder were repre-
sented by checks or verified by the testimony of W. L. 
Hansen and are undisputed as actual expenditures. 
These items on page 2 bring the total expenditures for 
the period as shown by the testimony to the sum of 
$79,692.36. On pages 1 and 2 are som·e green pencil 
crosses and check n1arks and som.e writing in ink, which 
were not on the exhibit when it was received and ap-
parently indicate that $2,584.20 of the amount specified 
on page 2 were added to the $62,643.84 shown in green 
pencil on page 1, making a total of $65,228.04. This 
apparently would exclude $8,014.32 of the items shown 
on page 2, and the total of the figures with the cross 
after them total this amount, so that excluded are $600.00 
paid by the defendant for entertaining contractors, ten-
ants and employees with reference to the new leases and 
repairs. The defendant testified that these items were 
less than 0 of his bill at the Ambassador Club or at 
the rate of $20.00 a month for 30 months, and that he 
incurred these expenses for conferences, and to promote 
good will and get the new leases and to get the repairs 
accomplished, ( T. 531, 536) ; $208.01 telephone bill based 
upon the monthly rate of $11.93 plus 0 of the long dis-
tance telephone calls; $443.00 which was interest paid 
on a loan from the Davis County Bank, all of the loan 
being used on the property; $1,117.50 attorney's fees 
which were paid for legal services on the leases, income 
tax statements, which included securing permission from 
both the state and the federal government to depre-
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ciate the entire property on the corner, and $5,609.15 
which represents checks .drawn to rash, (T. 605, 615), 
whieh the defendant testified went into the property 
in pay1nent of laborers, materialmen and others who 
required cash payments. He kept no record of the exact 
items since he figured the property was his own and it 
allcrune out of his own pocket, (T. 637). 
It is to be conjectured, therefore, since there is no 
finding of specific items, that from the actual expendi-
tures made by the defendant, $14,464.32 were stricken 
and that no allowance whatever was made for defend-
ant'~ 1nanagement or ~ervices, nor for the $10,000.00 
in cash with interest he paid to the defendant corpora-
tion. So this defendant was deprived of credit for at 
least $26,264.32 he paid out in actual cash. 
The figure $90,017.00 appears in ink on Exhibit 7, 
and this was the figure that the accountants agreed upon 
as the total rent received during the period of August 
1, 1945, to June 30, 1948, but does not take into considera-
tion the reductions in rent that were made due to the 
court's announcement that he was going to cancel the 
deed. The rents were paid upon defendant's agreement 
to make extensive improvements which the company 
could not make while it operated the property. However, 
we did not agree that this figure was proper. The rents 
were collected not through the efforts of the plaintiffs 
or the defendant corporation, but solely through the 
efforts of the defendant, W. L. Hansen, ('T. 498). Our 
position was that the defendant was not chargeable to the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
80 
corporation for the $90,000.00. ''All that William L. 
Hansen is chargeable to the corporation for is the rea-
sonable rental value of the property in the condition 
in which he took it", (T. 503). If this property is to 
be returned, both parties must be placed in status quo, 
and if the defendant corporation gets the property back 
better than it was before, they must pay for the im-
provements, (T. 507). As shown by Exhibit 2 in 1945 
before the defendant took over the property, the cor-
poration was receiving in actual rents $1,983.00 a month 
and were paying N. J. Hansen in that year $318.50 a 
month salary for doing the same thing he did while 
the defendant was in possession of the property; that 
for the previous two years the rentals averaged $1,132.50 
a month for 1943 and $1,459.00 a month for 1944, and 
l\ir. Hansen's salary for the two years was approxi-
mat,ely $175.00 per month, so that we could not be 
charged more than the corporation itself was receiving 
and were entitled to the same payments to Mr. Hansen 
as it had been making itself. 
After the court announced the property was to be 
returned to the corporation, the tenants, as shown by 
Exhibit 10 and the testimony of the tenants and Mr. 
W. L. Hansen, insisted on their rents being reduced be-
cause the improvements which were a major considera-
tion for the increase in their rents were not to he made. 
Exhibit 8 shows rentals for July, August and Sep-
tember of 1948 in the total sum of $7,669.00 and ex-
penses actually paid of $4,577.73 wi~h the proportion of 
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accrued expenses applicable to those three Inonths in 
the sun1 of $:2,-!1 :2.31, leaYing a net for the three months 
of $618.76. The figures in ink on Exhibit 8 which were 
not there when it was offered and received apparently 
show that $713.43 of the repairs were not allowed, al-
though they were actually made, ( T. 608, 613). Nearly 
0 of the telephone bill was not allowed, nor none of 
the office expense actually paid, which included the 
customary expenditures for office supplies allowable by 
good accounting practices, ( T. 609), including a desk and 
filing cabinets, and none of the chargeable expenses 
for the three months whieh had accrued but not been 
paid, totaling $2,412.51, nor none of the office salary 
of $200.00 per month. These accrued expenses were re-
quired, as appears from Exhibit 8, and have since been 
paid, but none of them were allowed apparently, and 
while the defendant was charged with all the rent which 
was due to his own efforts, he was given credit for 
none of these expenditures and there appears on Exhibit 
8 a deduction from the rental of $3,211.91, leaving a 
figure of $4,457.09 which is added to a figure of $24,-
788.96, making a total of $29,246.05. Where the figure 
$24,788.96 comes from, we do not know, except that on 
Exhibit 7 on the 2nd page at the bottom the figure 
appears apparently as a deduction over the whittled 
down expenses over the ·exaggerated income, so that 
apparently $29,246.05 is computed as the net income of 
the property for the period August 1, 1945, to Septem-
ber 30, 1948, disallowing all the items indicated, including 
?\pphi J. Hansen's salary which was actually paid. No 
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allowance for W. L. Hansen's management which was 
responsible for producing the amount he was charged 
with, and nothing for his $10,000.00 purchase price, 
and nothing for interest on it. 
Practically all of volume 2 of the reporter's trans-
cript is taken up with a detail of the expenditures as 
summarized on Exhibits 7 and 8, and a detailed recital 
of the methods by which the rent was increased. Exhi-
bit 8 was received in evidence, (T. 606). No useful pur-
pose could be served in a detail of this evidence since 
the summary of it appears on the two exhibits, and all 
of the expenditures are supported by the testimony, and 
as shown in the offer of proof, Exhibit 9. 
During the discussion on the motion for a non-
suit the court in answer to our assertion that there was 
not one single word of fraud or proof of fraud in this 
case, stated: ''I have the testimony of the last wit-
ness, L. F. Hansen, that the father was 80 years old; 
that he was under the influence of Bill." (T. 361). This 
same witness in the same testimony also stated that he 
was the one who wanted to protect the stockholders be-
cause all the tenants were asking that the rent be 
doubled. The father was not 80 years old at the time 
of the transaction in question. He was 76, ( T. 519). He 
was not under the influence of Bill but had been 
estranged from Bill for years. Bill had not even been 
here for years prior to the transaction, and the court 
later himself indicated that L. F. Hansen was not worthy 
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of belief as did counsel for the plaintiffs who called 
-: him as a witness. The following appears: 
''THE COURT: :1\Ir. Jones, are you calling each 
tenant here to have' him to say that he wasn't 
willing and anxious to have his rent raised~ 
''MR. JONES : That he never said anything 
about it. 
"1\;fR. JENSEN: I will stipulate that they will 
so testify. I never saw a tenant yet who was 
willing to have his rent raised. (T. 453). 
• :1:· • :1(: 
''THE COURT: Did you say you want to show 
that they were not willing to or didn't pay~ 
'':MR. JONES: That they were not willing to. 
They paid all the property was worth all 
through the years. 
"THE COURT: I understand Mr. Jensen has 
stipulated that none of the tenants will say 
they were willing to pay more rent. 
• "" • "" I just supposed no tenant in his right 
mind is anxious and willing to have his rent 
raised. I can't conceive of it." ( T. 454). 
The following appears: (T. 617). 
"MR. JONES: Now, Your Honor, you an-
nounced at the time when we concluded that 
you were not going to consider the work that 
Mr. Hansen did out there, and I can shorten 
this by making a tender of proof. 
''THE COURT: I understand Mr. Jensen 
wasn't going to object to it. He was of the 
opinion that his recovery was permissible. 
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''MR. JONES: Oh. 
"THE COURT: And, certainly, I'm not going 
to stand against both of you. 
"MR. JONES: Okeh. 
"MR. JENSEN: Well, wait a Ininute. I didn't 
hear what You Honor said. Read that, will 
you, ~fiss Parker~ 
(Reporter reads the Court's statement.) 
"THE COURT: You mean you have had a 
change of heart~ 
''MR. JENSEN: You mean I was going to al-
low that~ 
"THE COURT: Yes. 
''MR. JENSEN: Oh, yes. They had Sid Niel-
son down the last time and went to put him 
on, and Mr. Jones told you what he was going 
to prove by him, the reasonable charge for 
supervision and property management du-
ties, and I objected to it on the ground it 
wasn't allowable, and Your Honor sustained 
it. I have already changed my mind if I 
ever needed to. 
* * * * 
"THE COURT: Is it in the record~ 
"MR. JONES: No. There was discussion about 
it, and Nielson was here, and I said I was 
going to show what l\ r r. Hansen had done 
there and the work he had done. 
''THE COURT: All right Inake your tender 
now, .:\fr. Jones." (T. 618). 
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The tender was made and refused that experts would 
testify that ~[r. \Y. L. Hansen's sPrvices were reasonably 
worth $400.00 a month. (T. 629, 630). 
In disallowing any salary toN. J. Hansen the court 
did it in the face of testimony that :Mr. Hansen worked 
at least 40 hours a week. took care of the office, answered 
the phone, did about the same work as an office girl or 
stenographer, collected the rents when William L. Han-
sen was out, gave receipts for them and turned them over 
to ~Ir. "\Y. L. Hansen, and for his servicet:; he was paid 
about $170.00 a nwnth, when the corporation itself had 
paid him more than double that amount in the period 
just preceding the sale of this property toW. L. Hansen, 
( T. 318, 520). The $500.00 disallowed as the assessment 
for the Centennial program, is the same as the property 
on each corner was assessed by the Sugarhouse Chamber 
of Commerce. The assessment was not a personal assess-
ment but was an assessment against the property. All the 
merchants were requested to make a like contribution, 
and under those circumstances the $500.00 was paid for 
this propert)T, (T. ;)24). With reference to the $600.00 dis-
allowed as Ambassador Club charges, the total bill at the 
Ambassador Club was $1376.18. During this period when 
defendant Bill Hansen was trying to get the rents in-
creased and the program of in1provements inaugurated, 
he would take the people to lunch or dinner to discuss the 
question, build up the good will, and the $600.00 he 
charged does not quite approximate $20.00 a 1nonth for 
the period. He figured that this was a proper charge for 
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building up good will in business and public relations, es-
pecially in view of the results obtained, (T. 531, 532, 534). 
Disallowance was made in the telephone bill in the face of 
the testimony that it was used exclusively for the benefit 
of the business with the exception of a few long distance 
calls, ( T. '540). Disallowance was made of the interest 
paid to the Davis County Bank in the face of the testi-
mony that it was interest on mony borrowed from the' 
Davis County Bank that all went into improvements on 
the property, (T. 563, 564). With reference to the at-
torney's fees disallowed, the testimony was undisputed 
that they were for legal services in arranging the leases 
and preparing income tax returns and negotiating for 
depreciation on the property and securing approval of 
the state and the government, which directly benefited 
the corporation, ·except $500.00 which was paid for ser-
vices in connection with the purchase of the property. 
( T .569). In explaining the checks to cash representing a 
total of $5,609.15, W. L. Hansen testified that practically 
all of it went into the property, paying for help and pay-
ing for material. 
''A. Well, at that time we had labor that was a 
little hard to get along with, using to begin 
with Union help, and then their work wasn't 
very satisfactory, and finally hired some far-
mers and other people who we found were 
willing workers, but they requested they be 
paid in cash, so we paid them in cash. 
'' Q. How many of those people did you have? 
''A. About three different ones. 
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"Q. Well, now, how long did they workY 
'· ~\. \Yell, they worked in-one of them in '45 
a lot of work, a lot of hours in '45 and right 
on through up until about July of '47 or Aug-
ust of '47, approximately. 
''Q. Now, were there any supplies represented 
in theref 
··A. Yes, there was some supplies. I couldn't 
say exactly just what they were because I 
was operating my own business, and I didn't 
keep track of the things. If we needed money 
to buy things where we didn't have accounts, 
we just cashed a check and would buy them 
and pay cash for them and let them go at 
that." (T. 615, 616). 
''A. I didn't pay any attention to the checks. I 
made them out and just operated my own 
business, and I figured it was all my prop-
erty, and I made out the checks. I didn't-
frmn one month to the next I didn't even 
check to see what they were, really." (T. 637). 
~[r. Hansen also stated that the work of putting 
in the new store fronts has yet to be done, as above 
indicated, at an expense estimated at $115,000.00 for 
which he had obligated himself and received rental pay-
ments in consideration thereof for which the court 
charged him for the benefit of the defendant corporation. 
The court also charged him with rental paid for the 
last three months accounted for in 1948 and refus·ed to 
allow him anything for the accrued· expenses which he 
was obligated to pay, (T. 612, 613). 
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After the case was submitted and after the court had 
made an entered order of judgment against defendant, 
\Villiam L. Hansen, for $29,246.05, (T. 100), the court 
without consulting the defendants or any of them, and 
upon motion of plaintiffs' counsel dismissed J. R. and 
W. V. Jensen as plaintiffs, (T. 101, 102). There was no 
J. R. Jensen as a plaintiff, and W. V. Jensen is the 
Vivian J·ensen who appears throughout the record as the 
active instigator of this litigation in connection with Lewis 
F. Hansen. No notice of this dismissal was ever given de-
fendant, so that as the case stands it is dismissed as 
against the instigators of the lawsuit with the resulting 
responsibility for costs in the event this case is decided 
in favor of the defendant. 
On December 24, 1948, the day before Christmas, 
plaintiffs served on defendants proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, (T. 103), and immediately there-
after and without opportunity for the defendants to 
propose any amendments the court on the same day 
signed the findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
judgment, (T. 104, 113), and the judgment was immed-
iately ·entered on the same day. There never was any op-
portunity for the defendants to be heard, nor were they 
heard with reference to the findings o~ fact, conclusions 
of law. This was a proceeding strictly between counsel 
for the plaintiffs and the court. 
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AXD JUDGJIEST. 
The court affirn1atively found that this action is a 
secondary one for the benefit of the corporation brought 
by the above named plaintiffs against the corporation, 
Finding 2, ( T. 105). (X ote: X one of thP original plain-
tiffs remain in the case, and only two, Ralph Cutler and 
Hettie ~lay Bates, of the six who began the action. Rob-
ert Young, an original plaintiff, was dead when the ac-
tion was brought. \V. Y. Jensen and :Mrs. J. E. Jensen 
were not stockholders, but were son and widow respec-
tively of J. E. Jensen, one of the directors who signed 
the resolution for the transfer of the property, as did 
Lewis F. Hansen, another director, plaintiff). The find-
ings further find that Nephi J. Hansen since 1928 has 
been a director and president and general manager and 
wholly in control of the corporation; that no meetings 
of the stockholders have been held, vacancies in the 
board of directors were not filled, no information was 
given to stockholders with respect to the financial situ-
ation of the corporation. Nephi Hansen had represented 
that there was nothing to do except liquidate the mort-
gage, and that he has had full charge of all activities of 
the corporation, kept no books or records, during all the 
period discouraged the stockholders and refused to give 
them any information, made all decisions with respect 
to the corporation, repeatedly told the stockholders that 
he was liquidating the mortgage and indebtedness, and 
at all of the times treated and acted towards the cor-
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poration as if it was his own. He made no accounting 
to any stockholders and generally conducted the af-
fairs of the corporation as his own personal property, 
"and as his alter ego", (T. 105); that the articles were 
amended in 1919 to provide for the issuance of preferred 
stock, with voting power if dividends were not paid; 
that Nephi Hansen had informed the preferred stock-
holders that no dividends could be paid and had refused 
to give any information to the stockholders with refer-
ence to the nature and condition of the business except 
to assure them that everything was in good hands and 
properly taken care of; that the corporation in 1945 
owned the property in question which had buildings 
on it facing 11th East and 21st South, occupied by ten-
ants in apartments upstairs and business houses on the 
ground floor; that from August 1, 1945, to September 
30, 1948, it had a total income of $97,686.00, an average 
of approximately $2,500.00 a month; that on July 18, 
1945, there was a mortgage of $7 4,500.00 on the pro-
perty, payable at the rate of $500.00 a month, plus in-
terest; that on said date the interest payments were up 
to date but the principal payments were in arrears; 
that the mortgage was placed on the property N ovem-
ber 1, 1941, in the sum of $82,528.13, and that in July, 
1945, the property was reasonably worth $100,000.00. 
That in July, 1945, vacancies in the board of di-
rectors were caused to be filled by Nephi J. Hansen, "and 
there was appointed directors so that the board of Di-
rectors of said corporation at said time consisted of 
said Nephi J. Hansen, Laura F. Hansen, his wife, ·Mary 
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H. South'\\ick, his daughter, L. F. Hansen, his son, 
Clyde Hansen, his son, Hooper J. Knowlton, a business 
t- friend of Nephi J. Hansen, and one Joseph E. Jensen, 
there being added to said Board of Directors at said 
time Mary H. Southwick, L. F. Hansen and Hooper J. 
Knowlton." (T. 107). (Note: L. F. Hansen was al-
ways a member of the board of directors, as already 
appears heretofore). That in July, 1945, Nephi J. Han-
sen in the name of the corporation caused the property 
to be deeded to his son and caused the board of directors 
to adopt a resolution authorizing and confirming the 
sale to William L. Hansen for $10,000.00; that the cor-
poration never received the money, but the same was 
paid by William L. Hansen to his father and by his 
father used for his own purposes, and tlie sale by Nephi 
J. Hansen was never approved or ratified by the stock-
holders. ''That in making said sale said Nephi J. Han-
sen did not attempt to obtain any offers from any other 
person whomsoever, nor did he list the same with any 
real estate agent or broker, and thereafter caused a 
deed in which said corporation appeared as grantor to 
be delivered to the defendant William L. Hansen, which 
deed was thereafter recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County.'' That the property was 
all the remaining assets of the defendant; "that no 
stockholder was ever advised by said Nephi J. Hansen 
with respect to said sale; that said Nephi J. Hansen 
had always regarded said property as his own personal 
property, and that in so selling to his son William L. 
Hansen he maintained that said property should be 
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taken away from said corporation and should pass to a 
member of his family and that said property should be-
come in fact the property of the family Nephi J. Han-
sen by and through said William L. Hansen, and said 
William L. Hansen, in taking title to said property, did 
so in order to keep complete control thereof to gain 
for himself the rents, issues and profits thereof and to 
insure income to his father, Nephi J. Hansen, and to 
defraud said corporation and the stockholders of said 
corporation.'' That William L. Hansen knew the money 
he paid would not be used by the corporation but would 
be used by Nephi J. Hansen for his own use, (T. 108). 
That the board of directors at the time of the sale 
and the resolution approving the sale was illegally con-
stituted and acted improperly for the reason that the 
directors were either members of Nephi Hansen's fam-
ily, or his friends, and as such were subject to the 
control of Nephi Hansen, and signed the resolution with-
out any independent knowledge of the facts and solely 
upon reliance on statements and information of Nephi 
J. Hansen and without an independent judgment and 
without knowledge of the terms of said sale and at a 
time when the deed to the property had been executed 
and delivered. (Note: The record is undisputed that 
the deed was not delivered until July 28, 1945. The 
record is also undisputed that regardless of the date 
on the deed it was not executed until the day after the 
meeting of the board of directors). The findings of 
fact also find that Nephi J. Hansen prepared a resolu-
tion dated July 18, 1945, which was in fact prepared and 
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signed after that date and thus prepared and signed in 
order to falsify corporate records. The sale was made 
without any authority or bona fide ratification of the 
board of directors or of stockholders; that the resolution 
was signed by the board of directors of the corporation 
individually, and not as a part of any regular or special 
meeting of the board, ( T. 109). 
The findings then assert that on August 1, 1945, 
defendant, William L. Hansen, went into possession and 
collected rents to and including September 30 in the sum 
of $97,686.00, and that during that period he expended 
money for the preservation, operation and maintenance 
of the property and is entitled to a credit against said 
rents in the sum of $68,439.95. (Note: This is the only 
finding with reference to expenditures. There is no 
itemization or other finding with reference thereto). 
The court further found that the plaintiffs are not 
estopped; that the sale of the property was not an act 
of the corporation; that the directors acted outside of 
their authority; that the sale was not made in the usual 
course of business; that the possession of William L. 
Hansen was wrongful ''and he took possession thereof 
as a trustee for said corporation and for the plaintiffs, 
and he then and there become a trustee of all moneys 
and rents," etc., and was charged with accounting to 
the corporation. 
The court thereupon concludes that the deed is void; 
that William L. Hansen was a trustee for the benefit of 
the Granite Holding Company, and indebted to the cor-
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poration in the sum of $29,246.05, and judgment was 
entered adjuding that the deed" is void and of no force 
and effect, and that Granite Holding Company, a cor-
poration is the owner in fee of the following described 
property situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah." 
( T. 112). The property is then described and judgment 
is entered in favor of the Granite Holding Company 
against William L. Hansen in the sum of $29,246.05 
with costs to the above named plaintiffs. No judgment 
whatever was entered with reference to Nephi J. Han-
sen, and judgment was entered in favor of the Granite 
Holding Company, ( T. 113), in the face of the finding 
that the case had been vigorously opposed by the cor-
poration, ( T. 110). 
As heretofore shown, the judgment was entered on 
the day before Christmas without notice to the defend-
ants, and imn1ediately after the Christmas holidays plain-
tiffs made a motion for the appointment of a receiver, (T. 
116), and on February 3 the court made an order appoint-
ing a receiver, (T. 123), which order was revoked Febru-
ary 15, 1949, because the defendants had already posted 
stay bond on January 20, 1949, (T. 127), which stay bond 
defendants were compelled to post in the sum of 
$30,000.00. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The court erred in holding that this action 
was brought by the above named plaintiffs, Ralph Cutler, 
Hettie May Bates, and William S. Young, against the 
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Granite Holding Company for the benefit of the Granite 
Holding Company, (T. 103). 
2. The court erred in holding that since 1928 no 
information was given to stockholders with respect 
to the financial situation of the corporation, and that 
Xephi J. Hansen at all times refused to give information 
to any stockholders with respect thereto, except to assure 
then1 that everything was in good hands and being pro-
perly taken care of, (T. 105, 106). 
3. That the court erred in failing to find what the 
income and expenses of the property were during the 
period the san1e was in the control and management of 
the defendant corporation, and in finding that from 
August 1, 1945, to and including September 30, 1948, 
the property had a total income of $97,686.00, ( T. 107). 
4. That the court erred in failing to find that at 
the time of the sale of the property it was in a badly 
run down and deteriorated condition, was not paying its 
way, was operating at a loss; that no additional financing 
for the property could be secured; that independent ap-
praisals by competent persons were made of the pro-
perty at the time of the sale appraising the property at 
less than the sale price and at approximately the sale 
price, and that the court erred in finding that in July 
of 1945 the property was reasonably worth $100,000.00, 
(T. 107). 
5. That finding of fact No. 6 is ambiguous and con-
tradictory in that it finds that the board of directors 
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was filled and was complete at the time of the sale in 
question, and that there were appointed to the board 
of directors the persons named, and then finds that 
Nephi Hansen caused all the acts to be done therein re-
cited, in the face of the finding that the board of di-
rectors was completed and acting, and that the court 
erred in finding that the corporation never received the 
money paid by William L. Hansen, and that finding of 
fact No. 6 is a conclusion of law unsupported by any 
findings of fact or by any evidence. 
6. The court erred in making finding of fact No.7, 
and particularly that Nephi Hansen sold the property 
to William L. Hansen so that' it should be taken away 
from the corporation and passed to a member of his 
family, and that the property in fact became the pro-
perty of the family of Nephi Hansen, and then finding 
that William Hansen took the property in order to keep 
complete control thereof for himself and to insure an 
income to his father, and said finding is further in error 
in finding that William L. Hansen knew that the pur-
chase money would not be used for corporate purposes, 
(T. 108). 
7. The court erred in finding of fact No. 8, and the 
same is entirely unsupported by any evidence and is 
contrary to the evidence and forms no basis of any find-
ing against defendant, William L. Hansen. 
8. The court erred in finding No. 9 that William 
L. Hansen is accountable for $97,686.00 and entitled only 
to a credit of $68,439.95. 
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9. That finding No. 10 is a conclusion of law based 
upon no eYidenre and is against the evidencP that plain-
tiffs are not estopped. 
10. That finding N" o. 11 that the defendant corpora-
tion vigorously defended this action and thus opposed 
it is contrary to finding No. 2 that the action is for the 
benefit of the corporation, and is contrary to the judg-
ment in favor of the corporation. 
11. That finding No. 12 is a conclusion of law not 
supported by any evidence and is contrary to and against 
the evidence. 
12. That finding No. 13 that William L. Hansen 
was a trustee and took possession wrongfully is a con-
clusion of law and is against the evidence, not .supported 
by any evidence, and is contrary to law. 
13. That the conclusions of law and each of them 
are erroneous and against the evidence in concluding 
that the deed to William L. Hansen is void, and that 
William L. Hansen is indebted to the corporation, and 
that the corporation is entitled to judgment against 
William L. Hansen. 
14. That the judgment is contrary to the evidence, 
is not supported by the evidence, is contrary to the find-
ings, and is against the law in adjudging that the deed 
to William L. Hansen is void and that Granite Holding 
Company is the owner of the property in question and 
that Granite Holding Company recover judgment 
against \Yilliain L. Hansen in the sum of $29,246.05. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
98 
15. That the court erred in finding in favor of the 
plaintiffs and against the defendant, William L. Hansen. 
16. That the court erred in giving judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs and in favor of the Granite Hold-
ing Company and against the defendant, William L. 
Hansen. 
17. That the court erred in dismissing without no-
tice one of the instigators of this litigation, W. V. J en-
sen, and in attempting to dismiss his mother, Mrs. J. E. 
Jensen, (T. 101, 102). 
18. That the court erred in signing the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and judgment on the same day 
they were served on defendants and without an oppor-
tunity on the part of the defendants to object to the 
same. 
19. That the court erred in failing to find that all 
of the acts and conduct of the defendant corporation and 
Nephi J. Hansen were acquiesced in throughout the 
years by all of the plaintiffs, and that som·e of the 
plaintiffs were active participants in the consummation 
of the transaction sought to be repudiated, and in fail-
ing to find that plaintiffs sought to repudiate the af-
firmative action on the part of some of them and the 
acts of· the corporation so far as all of them are con-
cerned made in the usual and ordinary manner that all 
acts of the corporation had been performed for more 
than twenty years without objection on the part of any 
of the plaintiffs. 
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ARGUTh[ENT 
This being an equity action, it becomes relevant to 
scrutinize the identity of the plaintiffs and their own 
acts and conduct and to ascertain whether or not they 
are free ~rom blame and if in seeking equity they are 
ready and able to do equity. It also becomes material 
for and this court may review the evidence to determine 
whether or not equity has been done. Therefore, it prob-
ably will aid this court if we discuss the problem under 
three headings: I. The Plaintiffs, Their Pleadings, and 
Conduct; II. The Deed Should have been Declared Valid; 
III. The Accounting is Wrong. Necessarily the question 
of estoppel arises both against the plaintiffs as indivi-
duals and as stockholders under heading I, and against 
the plaintiffs as stockholders and the corporation itself 
under heading II, and under heading III must neces-
sarily be discussed the erroneous principles used by 
the court throughout the case as well as in the so called 
accounting. 
MAXIMS OF EQUITY 
It may be advantageous briefly to mention some of 
the controlling maxims of equity. The trial court seemed 
to be unaware of their existence. They require that the 
conduct of one who seeks relief shall have been of such 
a character as to entitle him to ask the court's assistance. 
If not, relief will be denied. ''Nothing can call this court 
into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable 
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diligence." 19 Am. Jur. 319, Sec. 462. (Note: All refer-
ences under this head are from 19 Am. J ur. by page). 
1. One of the most frequently invoked maxims of 
equity declares that he who seeks equity must do equity. 
At the least, an offer must be made to make restitution 
by one seeking rescission or the bill will be dismissed. 
A complainant seeking to have a transaction cancelled or 
a deed set aside must return or offer to return whatever 
he has received, pgs. 319, 320, 321. 
2. He who comes into equity must come with clean 
hands. Where it appears that the right upon which the 
complainant relies has grown out of a wrong or a breach 
of duty, relief will be denied. In other words, a com-
plainant will not be permitted to take advantage of his 
own wrong, pgs. 323, 324, 325. 
3. Where the wrong of one party equals that of 
another, the defendant is in the stronger position. Relief 
will be denied where the parties have acted with the 
same degree of knowledge as to the transaction. Relief 
may also be barred by the fact that the complainant has 
been influenced by bad motiv·es, pgs. 330, 331, 332. 
4. Equity aids the vigilant, p. 333. 
5. Wher,e it appears that one party was in the bet-
ter position to avert the loss, injury or prejudice which 
now must be borne by the one or the other, equity favors 
the one who has the inferior opportunity, p. 334. 
6. Where equities are equal, the law will prevail, 
p. 337. 
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7. Laches. The bill will be dismissed where it ap-
pears that the complainant stood by and permitted the 
defendant to expend sums of money in improving the 
prop€rty, p. 356. 
The foregoing maxin1s are generally so well known 
and understood that discussion of them seems super-
fluous. Every one of them was violated by the trial court 
in this case. 
\Y e come now to a consideration of the three head-
ings of this argument. 
I. THE PLAINTIFFS, THEIR PLEADINGS 
AND CONDUCT 
This is a suit by a corporation to set aside a deed 
given to a third person who is neither a stockholder nor 
a director. The suit is brought allegedly by stockholders 
for the benefit of the corporation. The authorities are 
uniform and without dissent that actions of this kind 
although brought by the stockholders are in fact actions 
by the corporation. It is also true that because the ac-
tion is equitable the plaintiffs even though they sue as 
stockholders must themselves be in a position to invoke 
the aid of equity, Smit'h vs. Stone, 128 Pac. 612, 621, 
(To be discussed in more detail later), citing Noyes on 
~~- Intercorporate Relations and Cook on Corporations (6th 
f: Ed.) See also, Fletcher Cyclopedia on Corporations, 
Volume 6, page 6934. (All citations in Fletcher are to 
·ir;. the 1919 edition, including both the 1921 and 1930 
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supplements, bot~ of which reaffirm the principles an-
nonuced in the main edition.) 
The action was originally commenced by Lewis F. 
Hansen and Clyde Hansen ( T. 1), to set aside a deed 
to the defendant, William L. Hansen, dated July 16, 
1945, and delivered to him July 28, 1945. Both plaintiffs 
were directors who voted (Exhibit '' D' '), to sell the pro-
perty, and authorized the president and secretary to 
execute and deliver the deed, (Exhibit "E"). The reso-
lution authorizing the deed was adopted after several 
meetings of the directors, including meetings on the 11th 
and 16th of July, (T. 202, 203), and was delivered by 
the secretary of the company, signed by all of the di-
rectors, to the attorney for the defendant, W. L. Han-
sen, (T. 422). Clyde Hansen never did authorize the use 
of his name as a plaintiff, (T. 426). He was dismissed 
as a plaintiff at the hearing on the first demurrers to 
the complaint, April21, 1947, (T. 22). The deed in ques-
tion was delivered and the money paid, (T. 313, 314), 
July 28, 1945, but the complaint was not filed until De-
cember 21, 1946, seventeen months thereafter and the 
summons was not served until the 23rd of Decem-
ber, 1946. The plaintiff, Lewis F. Hansen, waited 
nearly one and one-half years to bring this action, 
and then based the action upon what he alleged was his 
own fraud as a director, so that he could benefit there-
from as a stockholder. He knew that the defendant, W. 
L. Hansen, had made many changes and improvements 
and had spent substantial sums of his own money on the 
property. Neither the corporation nor the plaintiff di-
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rector came into equity with clean hands; both of them 
were guilty of laches; both of them were in the superior 
position to know whether their conduct was right or 
wrong; both of them were seeking to take advantage of 
their own wrong, and neither of them offered to do 
equity. Neither Lewis F. Hansen nor his attorney chose 
to submit the1nselves to the trial of this matter as a 
party and attorney, and on May 18, 1948, a month before 
the case came on for trial, Lewis F. Hansen withdrew 
as a plaintiff, and Benjamin Spence withdrew as his 
attorney, and both were dismissed from the case, (T. 
74, 75, 76). 
The first complaint was signed by Benjamin Spence 
as attorney for the plaintiff. Mter the demurrers to 
the complaint were sustained, and on .A.ugust 14, 1947, 
more than two years after the execution and delivery 
of the deed, an amended complaint was filed by Ben-
jamin Spence and LeGrand Backman as attorneys for 
the plaintiffs with five additional plaintiffs. LeGrand 
Backman never did sign the complaint and never was 
an attorney for the plaintiffs and never did make any 
appearance for them, (T. 148). The new plaintiffs, W. 
Y. Jensen and Mrs. J. E. Jensen, were never stock-
holders. They are respectively the son and widow of 
Joseph E. Jensen, one of fhe directors, who authorized 
the deed in question, ( T. 494, 495). W. V. Jensen is 
referred to throughout the case as Vivian Jensen. He 
and Lewis F. Hansen stirred up all this litigation. W. V. 
Jensen contacted the plaintiff, Hettie ~fay Bates, her son 
Keith Bates, and plaintiff Ralph Cutler, and Keith Bates 
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In turn stirred up plaintiff William S. Young, as ap-
pears from the evidence of these witnesses. In other 
words, the litigation was instigated and stirred up by 
Lewis F. Hansen, Vivian Jensen and Keith Bates. 
Neither Vivian Jensen nor Keith Bates were ever stock-
holders, and Lewis F. Hansen, as we have shown, had 
no standing in equity by reason of his own conduct. 
At the tirne Lewis Hansen and Benjamin Spence 
withdrew, E. C. Jensen entered his appearance as coun-
sel for the plaintiffs, but when the trial court asked him 
who hired him, he stated that he refused to answer, 
(T. 279). 
After the case had been tried and sub1nitted and 
the court had announced its decision (with no founda-
tion in the record to support such a decision), J. R. 
Jensen and W. V. Jensen, upon n1otion of plaintiffs' 
attorneys, were dismissed without notice to defend-
ants, as plaintiffs in this action. There is no J. R. Jen-
sen in the case, and the motion is headed Mrs. J. R. Jen-
sen. She is in fact Mrs. J. E. Jensen, although she ap-
pears as Mrs. J. R. Jensen, (T. 102). Thus, as the case 
stands, the persons who stirred up this litigation and 
who are responsible to the defendant, W. L. Hansen, for 
any costs and damages he may sustain have been elimin-
ated from the case. One of the main instigators in this 
case was dismissed without the consent of the defend-
ants. The court had no right to release this plaintiff 
from his responsibility herein, and it was error to do 
so. 
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Robert Yotmg appear~ n~ a plaintiff, but he had been 
dead for year~ when thi~ action wa~ filed. His son, 
"\Villiam S. Young, wa~ substituted as a plaintiff stock-
holder at the trial of the case. He didn't get into the 
case until three years after the deed had been given, 
and his standing as a stockholder is extremely question-
able, as also is :Jirs. Bates' standing as a holder of her 
husband's stock, he having died years ago, (T. 150, 
155, 156). :Jirs. Bates is the owner in her own right of 
fifty shares of preferred stock. Cutler is the owner of 
ten shares of preferred stock and thirty-five shares of 
common. 
There were subscribed in the company in 1929, as 
shown by the certificate attached to the amendment of 
the articles, 3500 shares of common stock and 7 40 shares 
of preferred stock. Cutler, therefore, owns 1% of the 
common stock, and he and Mrs. Bates together own 
60 out of 7 40 shares of the preferred stock. 
Thus, none of the instigators of the litigation remain 
in the case, and of the three remaining plaintiffs Robert 
Young is dead and is questionably represented by his 
son. Robert Young was, and Hettie May Bates and 
Ralph Cutler have been stockholders since 1920 or there-
abouts, and for at least 25 years knew of the manner 
in which the defendant corporation's business was con-
ducted. It was conducted without protest or objection 
on the part of any of them. Hettie May Bates some 16 
or 17 years ago when her husband died tried to find 
out through her brother-in-law, D. E. Judd, cashier of 
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the Utah Savings and Trust Company, (T. 160), some-
thing about the company, but he couldn't find out very 
much about it, and she was told that it had gone bank-
rupt, ( T. 167). :She knew the company had some pro-
perty in Sugarhouse, but never knew what it was. She 
never received any dividends after two or three years, 
and she never protested or objected to any thing the 
company did or did not do. She thought Nephi J. Han-
sen owned the company, (T. 162), but she did not know 
what business the company was engaged in, (T. 159). 
She never talked to Mr. Hansen about the business of 
the company or anything about it, (T. 162, 163). She 
has resided in Salt Lake City since 1921, (T. 156), and 
all the years she has owned the stock she has never 
known anything about the company, (T. 159). Ralph 
Cutler has owned his stock since 1920; has never re-
ceived notice of or attended a stockholders' meeting; 
never knew anything about action of the board of di-
rectors; has lived in Salt Lake City all the time; was 
acquainted with Nephi J. Hansen; never has talked 
to him about the Holding Company, nor about the com-
pany since it was changed from the Granite Lumber 
Company, and that was around 1924 or 1925 (T. 294, 
295). After the Holding Company took over, the in-
surance company that had the mortgage on the property 
had taken over the property, and Hansen was operating 
it under their direction. This was after 1930, (T. 296). 
He realized that the company had gone broke, (T. 297),, 
but he didn't know whether Hansen was operating for 
the bank or what not. Mr. Hansen never told him any-
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thing about the affairs of the c01npany except on one 
time he said, • • If there is anything left out of this com-
pany, I am going to see that my family gets it." This 
statement was made between 1930 and 1935, ( T. 298, 
299). He never n1ade any effort to remove Nephi as 
president. He felt that his investment was a bad one, 
and he made no effort to change the n1ethod of opera-
tion of the Granite Holding Company, and he knew that 
~ephi J. Hansen was running it and intended to run 
it, ( T. 299). He never got dividends after the first few 
years and supposed they were in a condition where they 
couldn't pay, and he just let things slide, (T. 300). He 
never read the Articles of Incorporation; has never made 
any efforts to go to stockholders' meetings, or to change 
the management or control of the company. He never 
took any interest until Vivian Jensen came down to see 
him, and until that time had never paid any attention 
to his stock. It was just locked in his box, (T. 302). 
William S. Young is the son of Robert Young, whose 
stock dates from 1920, ( T. 27 4, 275). At one time he asked 
Mr. Hansen what the revenues and rentals were, and 
he made no reply except that his salary would eat up 
everything, ( T. 279). His father has been dead since 
1930, and he has been the administrator ever since. The 
estate wasn't straightened out until after 1934, (T. 283). 
He only knew in a general way what the company owned. 
He knew they owned the Granite Mart property. He 
wasn't much interested in the company until after the 
estate was straightened out some time after 1934, (T. 
284). He lmew that they owned the Southeast Furni-
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ture Company property at one time, ( T. 285). He doesn't 
know of any dividends received from the company, (T. 
286). Nephi J. Hansen ran the company, but he didn't 
know who the directors were except Lon Fisher; never 
inquired because it wasn't any of his business. Up to 
August, 1945, he made no effort to find out anything 
except to meet Mr. Hansen on the street, (T. 287). He 
knew nothing about the company and never did any-
thing about it. Nephi Hansen was running it, and he 
let him run it without objection as he saw fit, (T. 289). 
These matters all appear also from the complaints, 
as does the fact that the corporation didn't keep records, 
and that all of them knew all the time for upwards of 
25 years that there were no meetings of stockholders 
or directors and no dividends; that Nephi Hansen was 
running the company as he saw fit; that it was being 
liquidated; that it had gone broke, and was in the hands 
of the mortgagee. They made no effort to change the 
form of management or the method of doing business 
and sat back during all the years until they were stirred 
up by outsiders who had no stock holdings. They were 
not vigilant and they made no offer to do equity. Yet 
they seek equity in their behalf. They had absolute right 
to obtain full knowledge, and they were in a better posi-
tion than the defendant, W. L. Hansen, to obtain knowl-
edge of the affairs and condition of the company, and 
they did nothing. Every maxim of equity would deny 
them relief in this case, as would also their own plead-
ings. It is also true that their holdings and any share they 
mig·ht receive in any recovery herein are insignificant 
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compared to the nwney the defendant, William L. Han-
sen, has invested in the property. The demurrers to 
the complaint should have been sustained, and cer-
tainly the motion for non-suit should have been granted. 
It is interesting to note that the same trial judge 
who presided in this case held in another case now be-
fore this court, (Behm Estate), that a father, who, as 
administrator, brought an action against one responsible 
for his daughter's death, was guilty of champerty, and· 
yet, in the case at bar, allowed persons to stir up litiga-
tion who had no interest in it and then permitted them 
to withdraw from the case and a judgment to be se-
cured through their intermeddling and in favor of stock-
holders who had slept upon their alleged rights for a 
quarter of a century. 
We will be interested to read any cases that counsel 
on the other side can cite that will support the trial court 
in this action. We have found none, and while we are 
not infallible, we are satisfied there are none. 
II. THE DEED SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
DECLARED VALID 
tr/~ (A) Undf:IY' (Jffl;y view of the Facts the Deed was the 
~~;~ · Fa.lid Act of the Corporation. 
We shall not attempt to cite many of the numerous 
cases or authorities, and they are legion, to show that 
the trial court was completely in error from the be-
ginning to the end of this case. 
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As we have already pointed out, early in the case, 
in fact on the first day, the trial court indicated that we 
were going to have to appeal his decision, and that he 
had already concluded that there were irregularities and 
a quick sale of the property, ( T. 215). He had heard 
practically none of the evidence at that time. This, in 
spite of the fact that shortly before that time early in 
the testimony of the first witness, he said to counsel 
for the plaintiffs that we should go into the question of 
whether or not plaintiffs should make a tender because 
he thought there was merit in that contention. The trial 
court said to plaintiffs' counsel: 
''Are you in position to make a tender if it 
appears that you would have to do so in 
order to do equity~ 
''MR. JENSEN: Well, I am not in a position to 
answer that question right now. 
''THE COURT: If you are not in position to 
to do it, there wouldn't be any need of tak-
ing a lot of other evidence and finally come 
around to the situation where you would 
have to make your tender in order to get 
this thing set aside." ( T. 151). 
Then, in spite of that statement of the correct rule, the 
court refused to require the plaintiffs either to make 
a tender or to show their ability to do so, (T. 152). At 
the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, in overruling the 
motion for non-suit, the court said as a ground for over-
ruling the motion for non-suit, that Nephi Hansen was 
~1.nder the influence of William L. Hansen because ''I 
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.:· have the testin1ony of the last witness that the father 
was 80 years old: that he was under the influence of 
Bill, and that Bill was with him all the time", (T. 361). 
The last witness referred to was Lewis F. Hansen, the 
self confessed prevaricator and dilrtluent director, who 
had testified that he, himself, was present all the time 
with his father and was collecting the rents, etc. '• I was 
there more than anybody else", (T. 348, 353). Later 
in the case the court said that this witness was not 
worthy of belief when he stated that the tenants were 
trying to get their rents doubled. 
At this point, it may be well to add another word 
with reference to Lewis F. Hansen. He claimed to have 
signed the resolution, Exhibit "D", three or four months 
after the date of the meeting and not to have been 
present at the meeting. Yet, when confronted with his 
oath of office and shown that the date on that was July 
18, 1945, he said he couldn't say whether or not he didn't 
;. sign both the minutes and the oath of office at the same 
time. "I wouldn't say. I don't remember." (T. 346). 
As a matter of fact, he signed them both at the same 
time, but it makes no difference when he signed them or 
whether he signed the minutes one day or one year 
later. Minutes are seldom written up and signed at 
the same meeting to which they refer. The fact of the 
matter is that there was a meeting, and he was present 
at it and his signature no matter when executed attests 
the fact that there was such a meeting ; that he was 
present and assented to the action taken. If he signed 
them four months later, he is even more at fault if they 
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were wrong, than had he signed them immediately fol-
lowing the meeting. No one disputed that there was a 
meeting of the board of directors. In fact, the evidence 
is clear that there were several including the meeting 
authorizing this transaction. It is imrnaterial when 
the resolution was signed. The important thing is when 
was it adopted~ As we shall later show, even had there 
been no meetjng and had the directors signed the resolu-
tion individually in the absence of a meeting, these plain-
tiffs could not complain. 
At the conclusion of the entire case the trial court 
had abandoned the undue influence theory as, of course, 
that could not be sustained under any of the facts in 
this case, and adopted another and entirely different but 
still untenable theory directly in contradiction to the un-
due influence idea. At that time the court would have 
Bill under the influence of his father to save this pro-
perty for the father. The court said that no one ever 
looked upon this corporation as other than the property 
of Nephi J. Hansen ; that the court would fix the value 
of the building at $100,000.00, on the basis of the ex-
pert who had never examined the inside of the building 
and had made his examination on a Hunday when it was 
closed and three years after the sale. He ignored the 
experts who examined the property at the tiine of the 
sale. In fact, he had even forgotten the name of one of 
them who was the most skilled and competent of them 
all. The trial court said also that he believed Nephi Han-
sen wanted to salvage son1ething out of the property, 
although the evidence showed at that time that Nephi 
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Hansen after the sale got les8 than he was getting 
before the sale. In contradiction to that the court then 
said he thought that "\Villimn L. Hansen wanted to save 
the property for the family, when the eYidencP showed 
that the family were getting nothing from it except the 
meager salary of Nephi Hansen for forty hours of work 
a week, and that Lewis Hansen, a son of Nephi and a 
brother of "\Y. L., was the instigator of the whole law-
suit. The court said the deed ''should be set aside on 
the ground that "\Yill Hansen and the father both were 
attempting to save this thing for ~Ir. Hansen", (T. 436); 
that the company could have put it in the hands of a 
real estate company, and that there was a collusive ar-
rangement between William Hansen and Nephi Hansen, 
although there was not one word of evidence of any 
such collusive arrangement, nor one word of evidence 
that W. L. Hansen ever did anything except make a bid 
in accordance with the price fixed by experts for a run-
down, failing property. 
This case, as we have indicated, was decided against 
us before it had hardly commenced. As one ground of 
deciding against William L. Hansen was eliminated, 
another was advanced by the trial court. The record 
shows that the trial court first announced that Nephi 
Hansen was under the influence of Bill Hansen ; then 
that Nephi Hansen was determined to save the pro-
perty for himself, and Bill helped him. Thus, Bill would 
be under the influence of Nephi; then that there was a 
collusive arrangement to save it for the Hansen family. 
The court's reasons are so at variance with each other 
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and so contradictory that we can gain only one conclu-
sion from them, and that is that regardless of the facts 
we were doomed from the day we stepped into the court 
room. 
The record shows without contradiction, as we have 
already indicated, that this company was in failing cir-
cumstances; that it was heavily in debt; that it could 
not pay its bills; that the principal payments on the 
mortgage were way in arrears; that the property was 
disintegrating and producing no profit; that the com-
pany had lost all of its other properties merely for 
their proportionate amount of the mortgage; that Nephi 
Hansen was the only stockholder who took any interest 
in the property; that he could not refinance his obliga-
tions; that he couldn't raise money for needed repairs 
and maintenance; that these matters had all been dis-
cussed long before the transaction in question here. 
There was no help to be secured from anyone to save this 
property. 
In 1939 the board of directors authorized, ''Exhibit 
1 '', the president and secretary to sell all or any part 
of the real estate at public or private sale upon the best 
terms obtainable and to deliver deeds which shall be final 
and to apply the proceeds on the mortgage. Under this 
authorization, and without any objection on the part 
of any stockholder the company sold the Southeast Furn-
iture and the Granite :Mart properties for the bare 
amount of the mortgage. We learn from the testimony 
of the secretary, Clyde Hansen, that regardless of this 
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resolution these sales were approved by the directors. 
The directors had the right to sell all of the property 
of the company without the consent of the stockholders 
under the Articles of Incorporation. These stockholders 
when they became stockholders were charged with knowl-
edge of the fact that the board of directors could sell 
the property without their consent, and by becoming 
stockholders they agreed to this provision. Under our 
statute the board of directors may sell all of the property 
of the corporation if the Articles so provide. 
''When the Articles of Incorporation pro-
vide that the property of the corporation may be 
sold, * * * by the directors, * * * sales, made in 
accordance therewith shall be binding upon the 
company.'' 18-2-16, U. C. A.1943. 
This may be done even by a solvent corporation. 
''but the directors of the solvent corpora-
tion may sell all its property without the consent 
of its stockholders, where such sale is expressly 
authorized by the charter." 13 Am. Jur. 923. 
Even without charter authorization the directors of 
this failing company had the right to sell all of its pro-
perty. 
• 'By the weight of authority, in the absence 
of statute requiring consent of the stockholders, 
the directors of the corporation in failing circum-
stances may sell either part or all of the corpor-
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ate property without the consent of the stock-
holders.'' 13 Am. J ur 923. 
To the same effect is Fletcher, Volume 2, page 2156 at 
2158·: 
"while there is no question but that minority 
stockholders cannot object where the corpora-
tion is insolvent or is doing a losing business or 
can no longer make a reasonable profit, there is 
no objection to a corporation's selling out at any 
time for any good reason provided there is no 
fraud or misconduct on the part of the officers or 
majority stockholders.'' 
See also Ballantine on Corporations, 1946, p. 667, to the 
effect that if a corporation is insolvent or in failing 
condition, the board of directors have authority to sell 
the entire assets, and there is no obligation resting on 
a corporation to pursue its business when it becomes 
evident that the enterprise will in all probability result 
in a loss. This is true whether the minority shareholders 
object or not, and even if there is a grossly unfair or 
fraudulent sale of assets, the right to equitable relief 
by rescission will not be granted where there is lach,es 
or a delay during which conditions have changed, so that 
undue hardship would be caused by the rescission. Even 
if there is an unfair or even fraudulent sale the courts 
tend to give small minority stockholders compensation 
in rnoney rather than upset a transfer which would be 
unjust to others by way of rescission. (Ballatine, p. 674, 
675). 
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In fact, Ballantine states that in case of a sale of 
the entire assets-
· • wide latitude is allowed to the discretion of 
the management and the majority. This is par-
ticularly true where the disposition of the as-
sets is made to third parties rather than to the 
majority themselves, * * *. In general, as we 
have seen, courts refuse to review the motives of 
the majority or the fairness or expediency of 
these fundrunental changes at the suit of minor-
ity sharesholders, on the ground that they are 
questions of business policy and judgment on 
which the majority shareholders have the right 
of determination. It can hardly be said that ma-
jority shareholders are fiduciaries in making 
these decisions as they are entitled to decide, if 
they act in good faith, acoording to their own en-
lightened self int,erest." Ballantine, p. 712. 
(Italics added) 
The undisputed evidence shows that the trans-
actions involving the Southeast Furniture and Granite 
Mart properties were consummated without objection 
from anyone, stockholders or dierctors, and that the de-
fendant, W. L. Hansen, knew of these transactions and 
the method by which they were accomplished. Early in 
1945 W. L. Hansen was contacted by his mother and 
father, Nephi J. Hansen, to try and save the remaining 
assets of the company-the property in question. After 
investigation he made the corporation an offer. At that 
time the mortgage was delinquent, and there was still 
due upon it $74,500.00 principal. W. L. Hansen made 
the corporation an offer of $10,000.00 cash, subject to 
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the mortgage. Several directors' meetings were held. 
The company had the offer under consideration for more 
than six weeks. Clyde Hansen, the secretary, conferred 
·with numerous individuals. W. L. Hansen also conferred 
with numerous individuals concerning the sale. Nephi 
Hansen had already tried to refinance the property and 
knew intimately and exactly its worth and condition. He 
had the letter from Mr. Harding, the executive secre-
tary of the Real Estate Board. Bill Hansen also had the 
information as to .Mr. Harding's opinion, and also the 
opinion of S. R. Nielson. After thes·e efforts, investi-
gations and meetings, the final meeting was held at 
which W. L. Hansen was not present, nor had he been 
present at any other directors' meetings. The board of 
directors was filled. The offer was accepted, and the 
deed was authorized. The company had the advice of 
competent legal counsel. There is no dispute in the 
record that there was a meeting of the directors. Even 
Lew Hansen admitted this. The overwhelming evidence 
is to the ·effect that there was a meeting of the board 
of directors at which the new directors were elected 
and the deed authorized. A resolution was adopted, and 
there is no dispute in the record that this resolution 
signed by all of the directors was given to the attorney 
for the defendant, W. L. Hansen, by the secretary, and 
the money was paid by the attorney to the president 
of the company. The secretary delivered the deed to 
W. L. Hansen July 28, 1945, and it was recorded the 
same day. This was more than a week after the meeting 
of the directors. If there had been anything irregular 
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in the election of directors or in the meeting, which 
there was not, W. L. Hansen knew nothing about it; had 
nothing to do with filling the vacancies on the board, and 
nothing to do with the action of the board. He paid 
his money to the person who had been operating the 
property for a quarter of a century without objection 
on the part of any stockholder. No one had more right 
to receive the purchase money on behalf of the company 
than did its president, Nephi J. Hansen. The stock-
holders, including these plaintiffs, had held him out to 
the public as their agent and representative all through 
the years. Both checks for payment of the purchase 
money were made to the Granite Holding Company and 
delivered to the president of the company. There was 
no one else to whom these checks could have been de-
livered or to whom payment could have heen made. 
Not only was the sale made to W. L. Hansen 1n 
the customary manner in which other sales had been 
made, but it was also made, in accordance with the 
usual business custon1 of the corporation and was made 
by authority of the board of directors. The trial court 
says that the hoard of directors was a dummy board 
because it was selected by Nephi J. Hansen. It is con-
ceded that Nephi J. Hansen owns the great majority of 
the stock of this corporation. In fact, some of the plain-
tiffs thought that he owned the entire company. As a 
majority stockholder, he not only had the power, but 
the right to elect any directors he desired. Certainly 
no one can successfully contend that a majority of the 
stockholders do not have the right to elect directors. 
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The Articles of Incorporation here provide that the 
directors may fill vacancies, which the directors did do 
in this case. The fact that the majority stockholder was 
also a director cannot invalidate the election simply 
because the dire~were friends or relatives of his. 
There is no law -.a requires him to elect enemies or 
strangers or people who are not friends. As a matter 
of fact, the record does not show that Nephi Hansen 
selected the directors, but even had he done so, there 
is nothing in the law that prohibits it. Under the Articles 
of Incorporation the board of directors had the right to 
fill up the board, which they did. The board was law-
fully constituted. Some inference has been made that 
because the deed is dated July 16 and the resolution 
authorizing it July 18, the deed is invalid. That does 
not follow at all. The deed itself is a warranty deed by 
which this corporation warranted its right to sell the 
property. The deed itself recites that it was done by 
resolution of the hoard of directors. With these re-
citals it was delivered to the defendant, W. L. Hansen, 
12 days later. Even had the meeting been held on the 
18th, it would have been merely a ratification of the deed. 
The board can ratify action previously taken if it is 
within the powers of the corporation. Clyde Hansen, 
however, cleared up this discrepancy and testified posi-
tively that the deed was signed after the board of dire-
tors' meeting, and that the date, .July 16, on the deed 
is a mistake, (T. 285, 287). Be that as it may, W. L. 
Hansen was not required to question the warranty and 
verification in the deed itself nor the resolution. The 
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deed had been executed and the resolution pa~~ed when 
the deed wa~ delivered to him. Even had Nephi Hansen 
sold the property without a 1neeting of the board of 
directors, tmder the authority of Exhibit 1 these stock-
holders could not complain because the thing was done 
in accordance with the usual custom of doing business. 
X or can these stockholders complain or contend that 
~- there was no meetin or that the directors signed the 
.:. minutes individually. Nor can these stockholders con-
tend that the directors were not de jure directors. The 
authorities are uniform that de facto directors may bind 
the corporation in favor of third persons, and that a cor-
poration may act by means of an officer de facto as 
regards third persons as fully and effectually as if the 
officers were de jure in all matters within the scope of 
the corporate business. (Fletcher, Volume 3, p. 3039) 
Under modern authorities there is no question that 
the board of directors may delegate the transaction of 
business to any number less than the whole board and 
may clothe the smaller number with the entire authority 
of the whole board. The directors have the power with 
out statutory authority to delegate not only ordinary 
and routine business, but business requiring the highest 
degree of judginent and discretion, 13 Am. Jur., 924. 
~)25. Ballantine states the modern rule as follows: 
''As presidents of corporations very frequently 
exercise, with the knowledge and tacit asquies-
ence of the directors, wider powers than those 
given them by the articles and by-laws of the 
corporation, court~ recognizing this fact, haYe 
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usually adopted a very liberal rule in favor of 
persons contracting with such officers, when-
ever there was evidence reasonably tending to 
show that it had been the custom for the president 
or other officer to exercise such powers.'' Bal-
lantine, p. 140, citing cases from Iowa, Minnesota 
and Wisconsin. 
Where there is a custom for the directors to act separate-
ly and not as a board, the corporation and the stock-
holders are estopped to deny the validity of their action. 
''In other words, 'a corporation, its board of di. 
rectors and shareholders, may waive any neces-
sity of a meeting of its board of directors for the 
transaction of the business of the company. 
* * * by permitting the directors to establish a 
habit or usage of assenting separately to the 
making and performance of contracts by their 
agents. By permitting such usages or habits to 
be formed by a long course of business, they 
adopt and become bound by them, so long as 
they acquiesce. If this were not so, great injustice 
might be done to parties contracting with them 
in their usual way.' '' Fletcher, Volume 3, p. 
3049. 
Holy Cr:o<Ss Gold Miming & "M!illi:tng Co. vs. Good!wiln, 
(Colo.) 1924, 223 Pac. 58 for instance cites the rule as 
follows: 
''a board of directors may act individually and 
the act be binding on the corporation if it has 
become a practice of the directors to act that 
way.'' Citing C. J. and Thompson on Corpora-
tions. 
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Even had there been no 1neeting of the board, which 
there was, it is undisputed that it was not the custom 
to hold directors' rneetings, and this had continued over 
a long period, so that these plaintiffs as stockholders 
could not have objected to the directors approving this 
transaction individually. However, there was a meeting 
at which the action was taken, and it is immaterial when 
the minutes were signed. In its business with W. L. Han-
sen this corporation did more than it usually did. How-
ever, even if the action had been as contended by the 
plaintiffs it is still valid because it would be in accordance 
with the usual custom and business. All the plaintiffs 
...: testified that Nephi Hansen always managed the cor-
poration as his own, and that to this they made no ob-
jection. 
Lew Hansen is the only person who raises any 
question about the meeting of the board. Even he admits 
there was a meeting. The minutes recite that there was 
a meeting, and the rule is : 
''whenever an act purports to have been done or 
authorized by the board of directors, it will be 
presumed, until the contrary is shown, that they 
acted at a meeting, that proper notice of the 
meeting was given to all the directors, that a) 
quorum of the directors was present, that the 
meeting was held and conducted in accordance 
with any special provision in the charter or by 
laws, and that the act was done or authorized by 
a 1najority, etc.'' Fletcher, Yolume 3, p. 3077. 
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This is particularly true when the minutes of the cor-
poration also recite that the meeting was held. 
If this were not the rule no one could safely do 
business with a corporation. Fletcher also says, Volume 
3, p. 3100, 3101, that a corporation is bound by the ap-
parent authority it gives its officers; that because a 
large part of the business of the country is carried on 
by corporations it is the practice to deal with their 
agents, and that ''the authority of an agent to do cer-
tain acts in behalf of his principal may be inferred from 
the continuance of the acts themselves over such a period 
of time and the doing of them in such a manner that the 
principal would naturally have become cognizant of 
them and would have forbidden them, if unauthorized." 
p. 3104. The public is compelled to rely upon the ap-
parent authority of the officers of the corporation, and 
if over the years they have done certain acts as the one 
in question, the corporation ''is bound thereby to the 
same extent as if authority were conferred in the most 
formal manner.'' Apparent authority does not require 
any formal resolutions, and if there is apparent power, 
then actual power is immaterial so far as liability of 
the corporation- is concerned, p. 3105. Missouri states 
the rule as follows, according to Fletcher at p. 3114: 
"a customary act by an official may be treated 
as valid and within the exercise of an actual 
authority, not necessarily because the company 
is estopped to deny its validity from having in-
Yested the officer with apparent authority to per-
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form it, but because the inference can be drawn 
that he was, in truth, authorized." 
And according to Fletcher, even in ~linnesota where it 
is held that knowledge is necessary when apparent 
authority is relied on, it is not necessary to have know-
ledge in order for the authority of the agent to be im-
plied, p. 3115. Fletcher also say~ at pages 3204 and 
3205: 
'• Furthern1ore, the president may have all the 
powers of the board of directors where they 
abandon the management of the corporation and 
leave the conduct of its business to him. Thus, if 
the president is in full charge of the corpora-
tion, and has been permitted by both stockholders 
and directors for a long time to exercise unre-
strained control, he has prima facie authority 
'* * *. ::Moreover, if the corporation is in effect a 
one-man corporation, and the directors have held 
no meetings for years, and such one man is the 
president who absolutely dominates, manages and 
controls its property and affairs as his own, any 
contract made by him is binding on the corpora-
tion.'' 
A point was made that the president did not turn 
the purchase money into the corporation. That is no 
argument against W. L. Hansen. He paid the money 
to the president of the corporation, with checks payable 
to the company, and what became of the money after-
wards is no concern of his. 
"It is no defense that the officer misappropriated 
the money and that the corporation never re-
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ceived any benefit from the loan." Chestrvut 
Street Trust & 8avings Fwnd Co. vs. Reoord Pub-
lishing Oo., 75 A. 1067. 
As a rnatter of fact, the corporation did get the benefit 
of this money. The resolution, exhibit "D", recites that 
the corporation owed Nephi Hansen back salary which 
he settled with the corporation for the amount of 
$5,000.00. There is no dispute that the corporation did 
- owe this money, and salary is a preferred debt. The 
record also shows without dispute that $1200.00 of the 
remaining $5,000.00 went to pay corporate obligations. 
The balance of $3,800.00 was represented by the check 
of W. L. Hansen payable to the Granite Holding Com-
pany and was delivered to the Granite Holding Com-
pany. 
Certainly, the court had no right to return this 
property to the Granite Holding Company and allow it 
to keep the purchase money. No case sustains that sort 
of thing. Nor can these stockholders complain that it 
was not paid to the corporation when it was paid to 
the individual they permitted.to do all their business for 
a quarter of a century - the individual they held out 
to the public as the proper one to represent them and to 
conduct all of the corporate business. 
The deed was the valid act of the corporation. It 
was authorized at a meeting of the board of directors 
legally constituted, as provided for in the Articles of 
Incorporation, acting with authority given them by the 
Articles of Incorporation. The minutes presume regular-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
127 
ity, and there is no evidence whatever that the n1eeting 
was not held. Even had there been no meeting and had 
the directors signed individually, and had they been 
only de facto directors, their act still binds the corpora-
tion, as we have pointed out. Under any view, the deed 
was the valid act of the corporation and transferred 
title to ,V. L. Hansen. The deed itself warrants the 
title of the company and the regularity of the proceed-
ings and recites that it was properly given by resolu-
tion of the board of direetors. The defendant needed to 
go no further than the deed so far as the corporation 
is concerned. The defendant had no part in the issuance 
of the deed and no part in the proceedings leading up 
to it, and these stockholders, in view of their past con-
duct, their asquiescence and inaction, cannot now as 
against W. L. Hansen say the deed is not valid. 
(B) These Stockholders Have No Cause of Action 
Against W. L. Hansen 
There is a well known principle of law that without 
any other and standing alone is fatal to the plaintiffs' 
entire case herein. It is settled without dispute-
''A stockholder cannot maintain a bill in 
equity to set aside an act or transaction which 
was done irregularly or illegally, but which a 
majority of the stockholders are entitled to do 
regularly or legally. Nor can a stockholder sue to 
set aside a transaction on the ·part of the direc-
tors on the ground that it was fradulent, irregu-
lar, illegal or in excess of the powers conferred 
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upon the directors, where the transaction is with-
in the powers of the corporation, and such, there-
fore, as a majority of the stockholders may ratify, 
unless, as may sometimes be the case, it is im-
possible to procure a meeting of the stockholders 
to pass upon the transaction.'' Fletcher, Volume 
6, pages 6899, 6900. 
This is just common sense. The majority of stock-
holders could have authorized or later ratified this 
transaction. The corporation had the power to sell the 
property. Likewise, even had there been no meetings of 
the board of dir·etors, the stockholders could have ratified 
Exhibit "D". The principle just stated is the corollary of 
another principle that courts of equity do not seek to 
do useless things. Of what avail this entire litigation~ 
The property has been returned to the Granite Holding 
Company which is still controlled by the ma:jority stock-
holders. They can still do exactly what already has been 
done. They can still sell the property to W. L. Hansen, 
and this entire lawsuit is a complete futility. Another 
complexity in this case is that the court has returned the 
property to Nephi J. Hans·en and allowed him to keep the 
$10,000.00 and has given him a judgment for $30,000.00, 
and at the same time stated that his fraud was responsible 
for the original transaction and the basis for the re-
scission. Nothing could be more absurd and when it 
is done in the nan1e of equity it is astounding. How 
these stockholders are to benefit b~· this judgment does 
not appear and is beyond our imagination to conjec-
ture. As above indicated, these plaintiffs have not been 
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injured because the Inajority can ~till do exactly what 
already has been done. 
\Ye have n1ade no atte1npt in this brief to do more 
than cite elenwntary priciples, recognized so far as we 
are able to determine by all the text writers and author-
ities. A~ already stated, we have fonnd no case that 
would justify the action of the trial court herein under 
the facts present. There are certain principles of law 
that prevent majority stockholders from using the cor-
poration to defraud minority stockholders, but even 
those rules of law require the minority stockholders to 
bring themselves within the principles of applicable law. 
The right is not unlimited, and there is nothing in the 
law that prevents majority stockholders or directors 
from acting as stated by Ballantine, supra, in their 
own enlightened self interest. In other words, majority 
stockholders have the right to conduct the business of 
the corporation as they see fit, provided they act in 
good faith, and minority stockholders have no right to 
complain of action of the majority merely because such 
action may be in the interest of the majority. The Ininor-
ity stockholders cannot run the corporation. They can-
not elect the directors. They cannot control the manage-
ment. 
.Jfinority stockholders or any stockholder~ for that 
matter must bring themselves within well recognized 
and established rules in order to rescind a deed given 
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by the corporation. As we have shown, they must re-
store the defendant to the status quo. 
''Certainly the plaintiff will not be allowed to 
derive any unconscionable advantage from the 
cancellation, and usually he will be denied relief 
when it is not possible substantially to restore the 
defendant to the status quo. The mere inability 
of the plaintiff to make restoration does not re-
lieve him of his obligation to do so, or permit the 
court to grant him relief.'' 9 Am. J ur., p. 384. 
The fact that these plaintiffs hold some preferred 
stock does not change their status. Preferred stock-
holders are not creditors of the corporation. They are 
merely stockholders with a preferred right to dividends. 
Fletcher, Volume 6, p. 6012, Ballantine, p. 503. 
The cases where minority stockholders may resort 
to the courts as stated above are limited. They cannot 
question the act of the majority unless the acts are-
(1) ultra vires; (2) illegal, or (3) fraudulent. Stated 
in another way, a court will not interfere in the suit 
in regard to matters intra vires, unless there is fraud 
or oppression. "The majority rules" is the basic rule 
as to the internal affairs of the corporation so far as 
the acts of the corporation are within its express or im-
plied powers. It is of no moment that the acts of the 
majority are unwise or inexpedient so long as they act 
in good faith, Fletcher, Volume 6, pages 6797, 6798. In 
the case at bar the acts were not ultra vires, as we have 
shown, but even had they been ultra vires, these plain-
tiffs cannot complain. It is well settled that even an 
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ultra Yires contract with a corporation cannot be set 
aside if it has been fully perfonned on both sides. 
• • "\Yhen an ultra vires contract with a corpora-
tion has been fully performed on both sides, 
neither party can 1naintain an action to set aside 
the transaction or to recover what has been part-
ed with.·· Fletcher, Y olume 3, p. 2631, Ballantine, 
p. 247. 
Also a majority of the courts hold that the party who 
has received benefits from the performance is estopped 
to set up that the contrdct is ultra vires. 
"ffitra vires" is applied to an act that is beyond 
the scope of the specified corporate business. An illegal 
act is one that is contrary to some public policy, or statu-
tory regulation. Ballantine, pages 246, 247. The giving 
- of the deed was not an ultra vires act, nor was it an il-
_r: legal act. The contract having been fully executed on 
both sides, these plaintiffs cannot raise the question of 
ultra vires, nor the question of illegality, as above in-
dicated. They are thus left with only one ground, and 
that is that the deed was fr~dulent. 
All of these directors were stockholders. None of 
them profited personally from this transaction, unless 
it can be said that Nephi J. Hansen profited personally. 
He got $5,000.00 which the corporation owed him for 
salary. He had a right to this. He was later employed 
h~- W. L. Hansen at a less salary than he had been re-
ceiving from the corporation. He had complete authority 
before the sale over the propert~-. He had no authority 
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over it after the sale. The only question is what became 
of the $3,800.00, and as we have already pointed out, 
that is a matter between Nephi Hansen and the corpora-
tion. It is no concern of the defendant, W. L. Hansen, 
who had no control whatever over either the corporation, 
its president or its money. The record fails to show 
how this sale deprived the minority stockholders of any-
thing. Had the property continued as it had been 
managed in the past, it would have gone for the amount 
of the mortgage. Stockholders never received anything 
from prior sales, and they did....r receive an extinquish-
ment of Nephi Hansen's debt and other debts of the 
corporation by this sale in addition to the amount of 
the mortgage. 
The trial court found that the corporation was the 
alter ego of Nephi Hansen. While the corporation was 
controlled and managed by Nephi Hansen, it was not 
his alter ego under any of the authorities. In order to 
be his alter ego it must appear that Nephi J. Hansen 
owned all or substantially all of the outstanding shares 
of the Granite Holding Company, or that the persons 
in whose name such shares stand held the same in trust 
for him, Geary vs. Oaixn, 79 Utah 268, 273, 9 Pac. ( 2) 
396. If this corporation had been the alter ego of Nephi 
Hansen, these stockholders certainly could not complain 
because they wouldn't have been stockholders. Nephi 
Hansen and the corporation would have been identical, 
and if the corporation was the alter ego of Nephi Hansen, 
he had a right to do with his property as he saw fit 
except as to the rights of creditors. As we have shown, 
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these plaintiffs are not creditors, nor was the corpora-
tion the alter ego of Nephi J. Hansen. Even though the 
finding of the court that the corporation was the alter 
ego of Nephi J. Hansen destroys the entire case for the 
plaintiffs, we still do not wish to rely upon that error 
of the court. 
~\s indica ted above, there was no personal advantage 
to these directors at the expense of the stockholders by 
reason of the sale to W. L. Hansen. Even a stockholder 
or director might have purchased the property instead 
of \Y. L. Hansen and still not have been liable in a suit 
for rescission, provided there was no fraud or unfair 
dealing, Fletcher, Volume 6, p. 6842. So plaintiffs must 
show that the transaction was fraudulent, and the only 
evidence that they can point to is the evidence of Mr. 
Keipe and the finding of the court that at the time of 
the sale the property was worth $100,000.00, and that 
is was not sold by a real estate company through solici-
tation for bids. The plaintiffs failed to allege or prove 
that at the time of the sale there were other persons 
willing to pay more for the property than it was sold for. 
This itself, as we will point out in a moment, is fatal 
to their case if based on the ground of inadequate con-
sideration. Aside from that, is the question of their own 
laches, estoppel, possibility of ratification and general 
uselessness of this lawsuit. Coming, however, to the 
question of consideration, nothing is better settled than 
the rule that inadequacy of price, standing alone, with 
nothing else to support the charge of fraud and collu-
sion, is not in itself any evidence of fraud and is not 
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sufficient to set aside a sale, 13 Am. Jur pages 1114, 
1115. This court in the case of U t;ah Assets Corporation 
vs. Do,oley Brot.he.rs Association, 92 Utah 577, 586, 70 
Pac. (2) 738, quotes with approval from Wait on Fraudu-
lent Conveyances, as follows: 
''Mere proof of inadequacy of price by it-
self has been considered insufficient to implicate 
the vendee in the fraudulent intent or to impeach 
his good faith, and indequacy of consideration, 
unless extremely gross, does not per se prove 
fraud. It must appear that the price was so mani-
festly inadequate as to shock the moral sense and 
create in the mind at once, upon its being men-
tioned, a suspicion of fraud.'' 
In that case this court pointed out that while the experts 
had said that the value of the property might be as much 
as $25,000.00 and others had said that it was not worth 
more than $10,000.00, the fact was that it would not 
sell for more than $12,500.00; that was the highest price 
at which it would actually sell, so the court refused to 
set aside even at the instance of a creditor, who was in 
a far stronger position than these plaintiffs, a sale of 
the property for $10,000.00. 'The difference between 
$10,000.00 and $12,500.00 is 25·% of the purchase price 
of the property. That was not sufficient to establish 
fraud. In the case at bar there was no offer whatever of 
$100,000.00 for this property. The only person shown 
by the record who was willing to take the property was 
the defendant, W. L. Hansen, and he paid $10,000.00 and 
assumed a $74,500.00 mortgage, knowing that he would 
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have to expend many thousands of dollars in addition 
in order to make the property pay. Aside from the 
fact that there was no offer of $100,000.00, it is ap-
parent from the findings of the court that the corpo-
ration would not have received $100,000.00 because the 
trial court wanted the property sold through a real 
estate company which would have charged a commis-
sion of 5%, or $5,000.00 in order to sell the property 
for $100,000.00, leaving a ficticious net of $95,000.00, 
and a theoretical and ficticious profit to the corpo-
ration of $10,000.00, or silghtly more than 9%, over 
and above what it actually received from the defend-
ant, W. L. Hansen. 
Under the theory adopted by the trial court this 
property could never be sold so long as the trial court 
did not agree with the judgment of the board of directors. 
In other words, the trial court assumed that he had the 
right to control this corporation against the wishes and 
desires of the majority stockholders and the board of 
directors. We know of no rule of law that permits this 
to be done. There was no evidence whatever that in 
1945 this property would have sold for $100,000.00. 
This property sold for the highest offer that was made 
for it. This sale price was upon the basis of the judg-
ment of the executive secretary of the Salt Lake Real 
Estate Board and its Board of Appraisers, and the 
judgment of the Executive Vice-President of one of the 
largest banks in the intermountain country whose special 
business it is to value property not from a theoretical 
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point of view, but from what it would produce. As 
against these two men who made their examination at 
the time of the sale, the court took the opinion of a man 
who did not appraise the property until three years 
after the sale when extensive improvements had been 
made, who did not go inside but merely looked at it from 
the outside, and who at the conclusion of his testimony 
admitted that if the property was not producing a 
profit, it was worthless. We submit that neither law, 
equity, good conscience or morals justifies the action 
of the trial court in this case. Where the price of prop-
erty is fixed upon the basis of an independent appraisal 
by competent and disinterested persons, it can never be 
subject to the charge of fraud. 
"where a sale is necessary because of the exi-
gencies of the case, the fact that the property 
is sold for less than its value does not of itself 
show fraud on the part of the majority stock-
holders as against the minority." Fletcher, Vol-
ume 6. p. 6804. 
This property was sold for all it was worth at the time 
of sale. 
This suit was not c01nmenced until 17 months after 
the sale. It was then commenced by one who has no 
standing whatever in equity and has since been dis-
missed fron1 the case. The additional plaintiffs were 
added two years aft~er the sale, with the exception 
of William Young who was added three years after. 
In the meantime, the defendant, W. L. Hansen, had 
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proceeded to spend hi~ own nwney on the property, he 
had made agreen1ents with tenant~ to n1ake greater 
improYements, and his position had been materially 
changed. These stockholders had not only remained 
silent and acquiescent throughout the years concern-
ing the methods by which the business was transacted 
and the corporation operated and thus lulled the public 
into a belief that Nephi J. Hansen was the proper per-
son to represent the company, but they had also waited 
to bring this action until \Y. L. Hansen had substantially 
changed his position. Under this state of facts the rule 
18: 
· • Even when a stockholder would otherwise be 
entitled to maintain a suit in equity under the 
principles stated in the preceding sections, his 
right to relief may be barred by laches, or he may 
be estopped to complain by reason of acquiescence, 
consent or participation in the acts complained of. 
The essential basis of all these is equitable es-
toppel.'' Fletcher, Volume 6, p. 6948. 
They cannot be heard to say that they did not know 
because they are required to know when seeking to 
place at a disadvantage a third person who has dealt 
with the corporation as they, the stockholders, have 
led the public to believe is proper. 
''There must be knowledge, but knowledge 
may be presumed from opportunity to know. * * * 
No fixed time can be defined beyond which delay 
will amount to laches. It is a question of fact, 
and the intervention of rights is an important 
test.'' Fletcher, Y olume 6, pages 6950, 6951. 
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As already stated, Lewis Hansen, the original plaintiff, 
was estopped to bring the action and it should have 
been dismissed. He had no right to sue on behalf 
of himself and other stockholders. Fletcher, Volume 6, 
p. 6955. When the new plaintiffs were brought in, 
there had been such a material alteration of status 
on the part of Bill Hansen that they should have been 
denied access to equity. 9 Am. J ur, 353, Sec. 5, 384, Sec. 
39, 388, 'Sec. 44 and 45; Ballantine, 361, 67 4, 675. 
A very illuminating case and one that discusses 
many of the principles with which we are here con-
cerned is Smith vs. Stone, (Wyo. 1912) supra, 123 Pac. 
612. In that case action was brought to avoid a sale 
of the assets of the corporation. It was claimed that 
the sale by the corporation was to a second corporation 
which was controlled by the same officers and stock-
holders and for an inadequate consideration, and that by 
reason thereof the sale was fraudulent and void. The Su-
preme Court of Wyoming discuss·ed the applicable prin-
ciples, most of which are relevant in this case. There it 
was alleged that the property had a value of $125,000.00 
and was sold for $7·6,500.00. The court held that a bill 
founded upon fraud or misconduct which does not allege 
with certainty and definiteness tangible facts to sustain 
its general averments of such fraud and misconduct is 
insufficient and cannot he sustained. The court also 
called attention to the fact that it was not alleged or 
proved that any greater price than $76,500.00 could have 
been obtained, either at public or private sale; that 
no one had offered or was willing to pay more for it. 
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Therefore, it was a matter of corporate policy and 
manage1nent as to the price at which the land would be 
sold, and that the mere discrepancy between the alleged 
value of the land and the purchase price wasn't any 
proof of fraud. The court further said that a minority 
stockholder cannot be aided by the court to control the 
action of the directors and themselves be allowed to fix 
the price. The court also stated that the action could. 
not be sustained because there was no offer to refund 
the purchase price: that the action was not for the bene-
fit of the stockholder, but for the benefit of the corpora-
tion; that the stockholder does not bring the suit because 
his rights have been directly violated or because the 
cause of action is his, and that he may be ·estopped where 
he has participated or acquiesced in the conduct of 
the corporation or failed for an unreasonable time 
to take steps to set the deed aside. The company there 
was heavily indebted, and the Wyoming court called 
attention to the fact that a minority stockholder can-
not prevent the sale of all of the property of the cor-
poration when the corporation is an unprofitable and 
failing enterprise, citing Cook on Corporations and 
Noyes on Intercorporate Relations. The fact that the 
two corporations had the same officers and stockholders 
did not prevent them from dealing with each other, 
and the mere fact that there might have been an inade-
quate consideration was not sufficient to charge either 
corporation with fraud. 
To the effect that a director cannot deny the legality 
of a directors' meeting at which he was present and in 
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which he participated, see St,ate Exrel Blackwood vs. 
Brast, 127 '8. E. 507, (W. V.). 
On the question of these stockholders lack of stand-
ing in equity see, also O.rme vs. Salt River Valley Water 
Users Association, (Ariz.) 1923, 217 Pac. 935, 940: 
''long-continued acquiescence in a course of con-
duct by one interested in it, especially when the 
rights of others are affected thereby, will in-
duce the courts to refuse him relief upon his 
subsequent complaint of it." 
and Buchwald Tr(J;(YIJsfer Oo. vs. H,urst, 111 Maryland 572, 
19 Am. English Annotated Cases, 619 and Note which 
holds that the corporation cannot complain that the 
president who exercised entire control over the affairs 
of the corporation used the money from a mortgage for 
his own benefit, and that where directors held no meet-
ings the courts would not relieve the corporation where 
innocent persons are likely to be made to suffer, and 
if corporations permit officers to exercise such con-
trol over its affairs as an individual does his own, it 
cannot deny the authority of its officers. 
''To allow a person publicly to proclaim himself 
authorized to act in a certain capacity, and to seek 
to avoid his acts when such avoidance would 
work to the advantage of the corporation, would 
be but to authorize the perpetration of frauds on 
an unsuspecting community.'' 
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In the Note at page 625 the cases are collected under 
the following: 
• 'The power of the president of a corporation 
to sell or mortgage its property may be inferred 
from the manner in which the business of the 
corporation is conducted with the knowledge and 
acquie:scenee of the corporation or its directors.'' 
Although the deed was not executed prior to the 
meeting of the board of directors, even had the resolu-
tion been adopted subsequent to the execution of the 
deed the corporation could not here complain because 
directors may ratify any act of one of their own num-
ber that they could have authorized in the first in-
stance, and directors at a regular and legal meeting 
may ratify a contract or act done or authorized by 
them at an illegal meeting, and thus render it valid, 
Fletcher, Volume 4, p. 3395. 
A FEW OF THE UTAH CASES 
This court in an early case, Sirnger vs. Salt Lake 
Copper IIIOJnufactvwring Co., 17 Utah 143, 155, held in line 
with the authorities that where meetings of the directors 
have been held and business transacted the presumption 
is that such meeting was regularly called and held for 
;:. the transaction of such business, and that where the 
validity of an act done at the meeting of the board is 
drawn in question, the burden is on the party attacking 
to show that such meeting was not held or that it was 
irregular. The only person questioning the meeting 
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is Lewis Hansen, and he doesn't question the fact that 
a meeting was held at which the sale of the property was 
decided. He only questions the time as to which he 
signed the minutes which is entirely immaterial since 
he did in fact sign them and cannot now attempt to 
repudiate his conduct upon which another has already 
acted. 
We briefly refer to a few of the other Utah cases 
announcing principles applicable to the case at bar-
Skeen vs. Warren Irrigation Co., 42 Utah 602, 132 Pac. 
1.162, holding that an act authorized by the charter can-
not be ultra vires, and that a court of equity will not 
interfere with the management of the corporation or 
with the determination of matters of policy made by the 
board of directors; that minority stockholders cannot 
control the discretion of corporate directors. In 
the absence of fraud courts of equity will not interefere 
with the suit of the dissatisfied minority merely to over-
rule and control the discretion of the directors on ques-
tions of corporate policy or business. 
Smith vs. K naJUSs, 52 Utah 614, 176 Pac. 621, that 
an officer of the corporation participating in a meeting 
is estopped to question the regularity of the meeting or 
the legality of actions taken thereat . 
. Beggs vs. Myton Oa;n;al & Irrigation Co., 54 Utah 
120, 179 Pac. 984, to the effect that when the Articles of 
Incorporation provide that the property ma:Y be sold 
by the directors or by the stockholders, sales so made 
will be binding on the corporation, and that failing or 
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unsuccessful corporations n1ay sell and dispose of their 
property provided only the transactions are not on fraud 
of creditors. There is no question in thf\ case at bar 
of the rights of creditors. 
Carlquist rs. Q·uayle, 62 Utah 266, 218 Pac. 729, 
holding that authority of officers of a corporation may 
be implied fron1 conduct and acquiescence and that ex-
~~- press authority is not indispensible under such circum-
stances, but if a corporation did not repudiate within 
a reasonable time even if the transaction was un-
authorized, it would be held to have been ratified. 
:; 
This court in Ellis.on vs. Pingree, 64 Utah 468, 477, 
231 Pac. 826, quotes with approval Page on Contracts 
as to the definition of duress. Duress, however, was ap-
parently abandoned by the trial court as a basis for 
holding against the defendant, so we will discuss that 
question no further other than to say that no reasonable 
mind could spell duress from any part of this record. 
(C) The Filndings of Fact, Oonclus~ons 'of Law 
and Judgment 
The findings of fact disclose that these stockholders 
knew of the manner in which the corporation was run; 
that Nephi J. Hansen operated it without meetings; that 
there were no books and records. In fact, the findings 
assert that Nephi refused to give any information to 
the stockholders, and that he treated and acted towards 
the corporation as if it were his own property. Had the 
findings stated the additional fact that this was all done 
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without protest or objection by the stockholders, such 
findings would have been a complete defense to this 
action, as we have indicated at length heretofore. The 
findings hold that Nephi never made any accounting 
to the stockholders with respect to the affairs or money 
of the corporation; that the Articles were amended to 
provide for the preferred stock 26 years before the 
transaction in question, and that no dividends were 
paid to the stockholders on account of the preferred 
stock, and that Nephi Hansen refused to account to them 
''except to assure them that everything was in good 
hands and being properly taken care of." We have 
looked in vain in the evidence for any support for the 
statement we have just expressed in quotation marks. 
According to the plaintiffs one of them never talked 0 
Nephi Hansen at all, while Nephi Hansen according to 
another one told him some 10 or 15 years ago that there 
was nothing left except his salary, and if there was 
anything left that it would go to his family, and the third 
never talked to Nephi at all and said he couldn't get 
anything out of him. The findings purport to describe 
the property in question, but are silent as to its condi-
tion. There is nothing in the findings to show that the 
property was badly run down and disintgrating, and 
that it could not pay operating expenses. Nor is there 
anything in the findings that prior to this sale, as shown 
by Exhibits 2, 3 and 4, the income was far less than it 
was after the sale and after the defendant had spent 
his own money in making substantial and valuable inl-
provements and had by his own efforts and by obli-
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gating hilnselt' for heayy expen~e~ secured inereasPs in 
rents. The findings state that Xephi J. Hansen eansed 
vacancies to be filled in the board of director8. There is 
~ nothing in the evidence t 1: at ~ e phi Hansen did this. 
Exhibit "D'~ says that the board of directors filled the 
vacancies. Even had N" ephi Hansen filled the vacancies, 
we know of nothing that prohibits hiin fron1 doing so 
where he is the 1najority stockholder, nor do we know 
of anything that requires hiln to eliminate members 
of his family fro1n the board of directors. The findings 
recite that Nephi Hansen caused the property to be 
deeded to his son and caused the board of directors to 
adopt the resolution. This is entirely contrary to the 
record. The record shows that the board of directors 
acted and not Nephi Hansen alone. However, even had 
Xephi Hansen acted alone, under the authorities we 
. have heretofore set forth the corporation and these 
plaintiffs would be bound because they had held him out 
to the public for years as having that authority. The 
findings further recite that the corporation never re-
ceived the money, which is not true. They find that Nephi 
Hansen used it for his own purposes, which is not true. 
As to what became of $3800.00, we do not know, but 
that cannot be held against this defendant, W. L. Han-
sen. The findings say that the sale was never approved 
or ratified by the stockholders, which is immaterial be-
cause it was not required to have the stockholders ratify 
it. The findings recite that Nephi Hansen dirln 't at-
tempt to obtain offers fron1 any other person nor did 
he list the smne with a real estate agent. \'/ e know 
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of no rule of law that required him to list it with a 
real estate agent, and had he done so, it could only have 
resulted in an additional charge against the property. 
But it does appear affirmatively that both Nephi Hansen 
and Clyde Hansen attempted to refinance the property 
and failed, and that they talked to numerous persons, 
and secured the advice and services of a competent at-
torney. There was nothing clandestine or secret about 
the thing at all. The findings further state that no 
stockholder was ever advised by Nephi Hansen with 
respect to the sale. This is not true. All the directors 
are stockholders. In fact, Joseph E. Jensen, is shown 
by the original articles to be one of the heaviest stock-
holders, and at the time of his death he was the second 
largest stockholder in the corporation. The insignificant 
amount of stock owned by these plaintiffs compared to 
the total capitalization indicates that so far as the re-
maining stockholders are concerned they are entirely 
indifferent to this suit or else they realize that they are 
in no position to complain. The findings recite that 
Nephi J. Hansen maintained that the property shall be 
taken away from the corporation and become the pro-
perty of the family of Nephi J. Hansen. Nothing is 
further from the fact. The property did not become 
the property of the family of Nephi J .. Hansen, and in 
truth the findings so show because they immediately 
thereafter assert that William L. Hansen in taking the 
property did so to keep the complete control thereof 
for himself and to insure an income to his father. As 
we have already pointed out, Nephi Hansen personally 
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1:: lost b)~ tl1e tran~rtction. He lost rontrol of tl1e ll1anag·e-
ment, and he lost in inc01ue. The findings assert that 
\Villiam L. Hansen k-new that the 1noney would not be 
..... - used for corporate purposes. There is nothing in the 
record to support any such allegation. The findings re-
cite that the board of directors was illegally constituted 
because they were members of the family of Nephi Han-
sen or his personal friends. How this constituted illegal. 
ity does not appear, and the finding is a conclusion of 
law which finds no support in the authorities. The 
findings assert that the directors signed the resolution 
without any independent knowledge of the facts and 
solely in reliance upon statements and informaUon 
furnished by Nephi Hansen. Suppose they did rely 
upon X ephi Hansen. They had a right to do so, and 
unless what he told them is false, they did have informa-
tion, and they had a right to rely on it. In truth, the 
directors knew exactly what was going on. They all 
knew that the company was failing. They all knew the 
condition of the property. They all knew that it could 
not go on as it had done, and that something had to be 
done or it would go merely for the amount of the mort-
gage. The findings assert that the deed to William L. 
Hansen was illegal because it was executed July 16 and 
recorded July 28. We know of nothing in that recital 
that would make it illegal, and that thereafter Nephi 
Hansen prepared a resolution dated July 18 which wa~ 
prepared and signed after that date. There is nothing 
in the record to show that Nephi Hansen prepared the 
resolution or that it was prepared after July 18. How-
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ever, it is immaterial when it was prepared or signed. 
The testimony shows that Clyde Hansen prepared it 
from the minutes taken by him and according to Clyde 
Hansen the resolution is correct, but there is a mistake 
in the date of the deed. The findings state that this was 
done in order to falsify the corporate records. How it 
would falsify the corporate rec ()rds to have a deed dated 
prior to the resolution authorizJng it, is beyond our com-
prehension. Even had the deec l been given on the 16th 
and authorized on the 18th, such authorization would 
have been a ratification, as we have heretofore pointed 
out in detail. Nor would it be material that the resolu-
tion was signed individually, which it was not. If it 
was the custom of the corporaf ion to do this, the stock-
holders may not complain as against a third person. 
Even if the directors did sign individually, that would 
not be unusual because that's the way they usually 
sign minutes. Minutes are not written up and signed 
at the time of the meeting. The findings state that the 
plaintiffs are not estopped. Had the findings stated the 
facts, they would clearly have disclosed not only an 
estoppel but laches, and a complete failure of the plain-
tiffs to bring themselves within any of the rules of equity 
authorizing the decision. The court purports to find 
as a fact that William L. Hansen took the property as 
a trustee for the corporation and that, therefore, he is 
liable for all the rents he collected, but not apparently 
to be credited with his contributions to the property. 
The court should have found how the business had been 
managed and conducted all through the years, should 
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have found that the corporation had sold other proper-
ties in the san1e manner as it had sold this ; that there 
was an independent appraisal of this property at the 
time of the sale; and that the purchase price was even 
more than the independent appraisal; should have shows 
that the corporation was failing; that the property was 
disintegrating; that none of the plaintiffs had ever 
lifted a finger to aid the corporation or to take an inter-
est in its affairs; that they had left its conduct and 
management solely to Nephi Hansen without objections, 
and that some of them didn't even know what property 
it had or where it was. The findings should have shown 
that the defendant, William L. Hansen, paid $10,000.00 
to the company, and that he had not had it returned. 
Then a judgment against plaintiffs would be compelled. 
The conclusions and judgment are fantastic. They 
conclude that this corporation by making a fraudulent 
sale should benefit by the same, keep the money it re-
ceived, get tht property back with all the improvements 
and $30,000.00 in addition. By its own fraud the cor-
pora:tion is changed from a failing activity to one that 
has a chance to survive; gets its property improved, and 
a judgment against the one who did the improving, 
and all this in the name of equity. It is shocking and 
against all principles of right and justice. 
III. THE ACCOUNTING WAS WRONG 
Black on Rescission, Y olume 3, 1929, has a whole 
chapter to the effect that in rescission there must be a 
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restitution or restoration of the status quo, commencing 
at page 1482: 
''Rescission of a contract does not involve 
the claim or award of compensation to the in-
jured party on account of fraud or other vice 
inherent in the contract, nor does it imply a re-
adjustment of the rights of the parties after a 
recognized breach of the contract, but it means 
the undoing of the contract, the making of it 
as if it had never been. Hence the first and prime 
essential of rescission is the 'restitutio in inte-
grum', that is, the restoration of each of the 
parties to the position, with reference to his pro-
perty and his rights, which he occupied imme-
diately before the making of the contract." 
This is good sense as well as good law. If this contract 
should have been rescinded, which we have shown it 
should not have been, then the court should have fol-
lowed the rule just stated. W. L. Hansen should be ac-
countable only for the reasonable rent of the property 
in the condition in which he received it. He is not a 
tenant of the vendor, nor is he in the position of having 
occupied as a tenant, ''and consequently he is not 
chargeable with 'rent', properly so called, but only to 
the extent of the benefit actually derived from the use 
of the land during his occupation of it. This amount, 
however, as it appears from the cases, is usually reckon-
ed as being equivalent to the fair or reasonable rental 
value of the land, * * * .But if the improvements were 
made by the vendee after taking possession, and the 
land had no rental value outside of suc.h improve1nents, 
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the vendor will not be entitled to clain1 the value of 
the use of the prenrises as so improved, unless perhaps 
frOin the date of bringing his suit to rescind.'' Black, 
p. 1536. Placing the parties in status quo and charging 
the defendant with the rental of the property as he 
received it. would not permit the corporation to demand 
more rent than the corporation itself was receiving at 
the time of the transaction. Exhibit 2 shows that for 
the first four n1onths of 19-!5 the corporation received 
$7,932.00 as rent, or $1,983.00 a month. The trial court 
required the defendant to account from August 1, 1945, 
to September 30, 1948, a period of 38 months, which at 
the rate of $1,983.00 a month would total $7·5,354.00 in-
stead of the $97,686.00 found by the court. The court 
found that William L. Hansen had expended on the 
property $68, 439. 95. Before the sale the corporation paid 
Nephi Hansen a salary for operating the property. The 
trial court disallowed the salary paid Nephi Hansen 
by William L. Hansen for doing the same thing. It 
should have been allowed. Had the corporation kept 
the property it would have paid Nephi Hansen, accord-
ing to Exhibit 2, approximately $300.00 a month instead 
of the $170.00 a month paid him by W. L. Hansen. The 
court should also have allowed the other items shown 
on Exhibits 7 and 8 because they were all proved. The 
court should have credited W. L. Hansen with $79,692.36, 
plus $2,412.51, plus his $10,000.00 purchase payment with 
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interest for 38 months, plus a reasonable management· 
of $400.00 a month, for raising rents and improving the 
property and managing it, or a total of $109,204.87, and 
required the corporation to pay him $33,850.87 as resti-
tution for the rescission. This would have been in accord-
ance with equity and would have pJaced the parties in 
status quo because the corporation has go't its property 
back with the rents raised, the property improved, and 
the whole enterprise placed where it may eventually get 
on a going basis, by the efforts of the defendant, W. L. 
Hansen. The corporation could not have done this on 
its own account. W. L. Hansen by the expenditure of 
his time, efforts, money and skill has done what the cor-
poration could never have done as it was being operated, 
and W. L. Hansen cannot be restored to a status quo 
without remuneration as indicated. Had the court made 
a proper accounting, it would have ended this litigation. 
None of these stockholders would be found willing to 
advance this sum or any of it, particularly in view of 
the small holdings they have compared with the total 
capitalization. 
What a travesty it is to hold that this corporation 
fraudulently disposed of the property, then permit the 
corporation to receive the fruits of its fraud. If there 
was fraud, which there was not, it was the fraud of 
Nephi J. Hansen, and yet Nephi J. Hansen will be the 
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chief beneficiary of the judgn1ent of the trial eourt since 
he is the principal stockholder, eYen to the extent, so 
says the trial court, of being a sufficient owner that 
the corporation is his alter ego. Look at the case any 
way you will, either X ephi J. Hansen or the corpora-
tion itself, which is Nephi J. Hansen, is rewarded by a 
court of equity for his fraudulent conduct at the expense 
of one who relied upon him. 
In fact and in law there should have been no ac-
counting. There should have been no rescission. The 
accounting, however, as it was made is entirely erron-
eous. \Y. L. Hansen was entitled to an allowance for 
the cost of keeping and an allowance for the restoration. 
He should have been allowed for his improvements and 
repairs, for taxes and encumbrances paid, his purchase 
money with interest, Black, p.gs. 1538-1544. 
The only way William L. Hansen could be a trustee 
would be as a constructive trustee by reason of his fraud 
and the innocence of the vendor. Even according to the 
trial court both parties were pari delicto and conse-
quently should have been left where the court found 
them, but certainly there is no case that holds that a 
vendor who is guilty of fraud equal to or in excess of 
that of the vendee, can hold the vendee as a constructive 
trustee for hin1. 
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CONCLUSION 
It, therefore, appears from the record that the ori-
ginal plaintiff, Lewis F. Hansen, had no right to sue. 
The case should have been dis1nissed then and that would 
have ended it. The other plaintiffs have been guilty 
of laches, and they are estopped to question the transaC-
tion in question. This appears from their own pleadings 
and without dispute in the record. It also appears that 
the board of directors had the right to do what they 
did, and even had they done so irregularly or without 
authority, equity will not set aside the transaction be-
cause they could have ratified what they did, and equity 
will not do a futile thing. However, there was no irregu-
larity or illegality in the transaction. The Articles of 
Incorporation gav.e the directors the right to sell the pro-
perty. They gave the directors a right to fill the board. 
The board was filled, the meeting was held, and the trans-
action authorized and consummated. Even had there 
been no meeting of the board, it was in accordance with 
long practice to allow Nephi Hansen to manage the cor-
poration and sell its property, and these stockholders 
cannot question such action. The sale was for an ade-
quate and proper consideration. The stockholders can-
not complain for a further reason that William L. Han-
sen has materially changed his position due to their 
delay in bringing an action, and they cannot be heard 
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to say they had no notic.e of the transaction because they 
were required to have knowledge of the 1nethod in which 
their corporation had been managed and its business 
conducted for 25 years preceding the transaction in ques-
tion. There should have been no accounting, and the 
-·- accounting as made is completely wrong. Furthermore, 
there still is no offer from these plaintiffs to do equity. 
They have been allowed to harass and embarrass and 
annoy the defendant when they had nothing to gain and 
could gain nothing ultimately from this lawsuit. Had 
they been required in the beginning to make a tender 
to return to W. L. Hansen what the corporation had re-
ceived from him, the lawsuit would have ended at that 
time. This whole proceeding was erroneous, inequitable, 
__: in violation of all the applicable principles of equity. 
The judgment should be reversed, and the trial court 
should be directed to find for the defendant, William L. 
Hansen, that the deed is valid and binding. The trial 
eourt should also be directed to reinstate W. V. Jensen 
and Mrs. J. E. Jensen as plaintiffs in order that they 
may be liable for the defendant's costs in this case. The 
trial court gave no judgment against Nephi Hansen so 
there is nothing to consider so far as he is concerned. 
The trial court gave jud~ent in favor of the Granite 
Holding Company which it vigorously opposed so there 
is no reason to hold the Granite Holding Company for 
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costs. Costs should be awarded against these plaintiffs, 
and W. V. Jensen and Mrs. J. E. Jensen. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, 
Attoroey f~or defe-ndiant, 
Wrill~am L. Uansen 
NOTE 
Since there was judgment in favor of the Granite 
Holding Company and no judgment against Nephi Han-
sen, those parties have submitted no briefs, but they 
both insist that the judgment of the trial court was 
wrong in the particulars and for the reasons specified 
in the foregoing brief. 
E. W. CLYDE 
AttO'rneys for Gram;it.e Holding Co. 
~ 
·v 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE & BLACK ;} 
~ Attorneys for N ep,hi J. Hams en 
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